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Personnel scheduling problems occur in a variety of domains, such as transporta-
tion, manufacturing, or the service industry. One sector where scheduling is very
important is the healthcare sector. In other industries—such as transportation or
manufacturing—the negative outcomes of bad scheduling range from idle employees
(overstaffing) to idle vehicles or machines (understaffing). In the healthcare sector,
however, bad scheduling can lead to severe illness or even death when patients are
not treated due to an insufficient number of staff available. It is therefore not sur-
prising that physician and nurse scheduling problems have seen a lot of research
attention (Erhard et al., 2018; Cheang et al., 2003).
All staff scheduling problems can be categorized according to their planning horizon.
We distinguish between staffing problems (“How many people should I employ?”)
with a long-term planning horizon of several months or years, rostering problems
(“When does which employee have to work?”) with a planning horizon of several
weeks to a few months, and rescheduling problems (“Who can substitute for the
employee who is unexpectedly absent?”) with a planning horizon of a few hours
or days. The contributions in this thesis focus on the rostering and rescheduling
problems. The general form of the rostering problem is always the same: Given
a set of employees, their availability, and a demand structure for the presence of
these employees, find a schedule that ensures coverage of demand while respecting
a set of constraints, such as maximum work time, labor law, fairness, and others.
Rescheduling problems exhibit the same structure and additionally try to minimize
deviations to an existing schedule.
1
1 Introduction
While the basic problem structure of the rostering problem might fool most people
into thinking that it would be easy to solve, the actual dimensions of the problem
quickly become clear when illustrated with a short example. Let our illustrative
example be a medium-sized hospital department with 30 physicians, out of which
we need 5 to be working specific overnight duties each day. This gives us 30!
25!
≈ 1.7·107
possibilities to assign these physicians to overnight duties on a single day. To create
the roster for an entire month, we need to make this assignment decision on each
day of the month. For a four-week planning horizon of 28 days, this leaves us with
(1.7 · 107)28 ≈ 3.3 · 10202 possible schedules. To get a feeling for the magnitude of
this number, contrast this with the estimated number of particles in the observable
universe, which is 1090 (Guth, 2001). It is not hard to imagine that enumerating
all the possible schedules, eliminating the invalid ones, and then finding the best
schedule is not only a hard but an impossible feat for a human.
Due to the massive complexity of the problem, even before computers were readily
available to every business, algorithms were developed to assist with creating valid
schedules (Baker, 1974). These ensured that, by following the algorithm, schedulers
would always arrive at a valid schedule that respects the constraints baked into the
respective algorithm. However, as the algorithms had to be executed by hand, they
were simple and inflexible by modern standards. The potential for automation of
scheduling tasks was quickly apparent when the first computers were commercially
available. Early computer-based systems could already create schedules automati-
cally while respecting certain hard constraints and minimizing the violation of soft
constraints, such as physician preferences or fairness (Gierl et al., 1986).
Modern scheduling approaches have access to an immensely higher amount of mem-
ory and processing power. Whereas early models were run on mainframes in data
centers with a few megabytes of memory, today’s consumer computers are several
magnitudes more powerful. This feature, coupled with more efficient algorithms,
enables today’s scheduling approaches to incorporate a multitude of constraints. It
is not uncommon for scheduling models, such as the ones presented in this thesis,
to have complex constraints regarding a maximum amount of consecutive days of
work, limits on overtime hours per week, or requirements for equal distribution of
2
1 Introduction
preference fulfillment or workload. This processing power has enabled schedulers
and scientists to explore more sophisticated ways of how fairness constraints can be
incorporated in the scheduling process. While early approaches, such as the schedul-
ing algorithm presented by Baker (1974), were designed in such a way that they
would never exceed given upper bounds on consecutive working days or consecutive
assigned weekends, they could not dynamically adjust the assignments to ensure an
equal satisfaction or workload among all employees. Additionally, they were not
designed to create updated schedules in case of unforeseen absences and were also
unable to compensate for violations incurred via rescheduling.
As physicians are a very costly resource to hospitals, managers have a high incentive
to minimize turnover and physician attrition. Hospitals therefore go to great lengths
to keep their physicians satisfied. This also manifests on duty rosters where sched-
ulers incorporate various fairness measures. Physicians are usually able to submit
preferences specifying when they want to or do not want to work. Schedulers then
try to respect these preferences. Furthermore, they want to assign an equal workload
to each physician in order to prevent physicians feeling disadvantaged in comparison
with their colleagues. A multitude of further fairness measures is described in the
literature (see e.g., Karsu and Morton, 2015; Bertsimas et al., 2011; Stolletz and
Brunner, 2012), but in this thesis we will focus on preference fulfillment and how it
interacts with other objectives, such as, e.g., equal workload distribution or stability
during rescheduling.
While there is a large body of research on personnel scheduling in general (Ernst
et al., 2004) and nurse (Cheang et al., 2003) and physician scheduling Erhard et al.
(2018) in particular, there are still a few research gaps. The following open research
questions are answered by this thesis.
1. How can existing physician schedules be adapted in case of unexpected ab-
sences?
2. How does rescheduling on physician schedules affect plan quality?
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3. Does maximizing preference fulfillment on physician schedules during each
planning horizon ensure fairness in the long term?
4. How can long-term fairness in preference fulfillment on physician schedules be
guaranteed?
5. How can long-term equal workload distribution on physician schedules be guar-
anteed?
6. How does long-term equal workload distribution affect long-term fairness in
preference fulfillment on physician schedules?
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2, all contributions
contained in this thesis are summarized. The contributions are included in their full
version in the appendix. Section 3 provides answers to the research questions above
and details how these answers are derived from the presented contributions. Finally,
Section 4 concludes this work and highlights opportunities for further research.
4
2 Summaries of the contributions
This thesis makes several contributions to current literature, which are summarized
in this section. All contributions can be found in the appendix. The order of
the contributions follows the chronological order in which the contributions were
submitted to scientific journals.
2.1 Online rescheduling of physicians in hospitals
Gross et al. (2018b) explore the physician rescheduling problem. They present a
model to update physician rosters in the case of unexpected absences. The developed
model is applied to data from a German university hospital. Results of a case study
confirm that this model enables the scheduler to influence the trade-off between plan
quality and plan stability. This contribution has been published in Flexible Services
and Manufacturing Journal, which is ranked in category B in the VHB-JOURQUAL3
ranking (Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V., 2015). It can be
found in its entirety in Appendix A.
The creation of physician rosters is a complex task due to the multitude of con-
straints which need to be respected: Qualifications of physicians, individual agree-
ments, maximum amount of sequential working days, part-time contracts, and many
more. Especially the qualification constraints necessitate the development of models
specific to physician scheduling and prevent the application of nurse scheduling mod-
els. Where nurses usually have at most two qualification levels (regular nurses and
head nurses), physicians usually have at least five or even more. This is explained
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by the different specializations of physicians as well as the progress of physician ed-
ucation after getting their degree from university. Furthermore, physician schedules
often are acyclic schedules, whereas nurses are usually scheduled cyclically.
An unsolved problem in research is the adaptation of physician schedules in the
case of unexpected absences. While there are approaches for nurse rescheduling,
they cannot be applied to physicians due to the different problem structure. As
the updated schedule needs to respect all constraints of the original schedule and
also needs to minimize the number of rescheduling operations, the rescheduling
problem is even more complex than the physician scheduling problem. The discussed
contribution presents the first model for physician rescheduling. When creating an
updated plan, the scheduler has to make a trade-off decision between two different
goals: Should the new schedule have minimal deviations from the existing plan or
should it conform to plan quality goals as much as possible? This trade-off between
plan quality and stability is explored in this contribution.
The presented model assigns physicians to duties (i.e., late shift or overnight work)
and workstations. For duty assignments, the model respects physician qualifications,
demand for duties, physician preferences for a specific duty or for not being assigned
to any duty on a specific day, and fairness in terms of exceeding a maximum number
of duty assignments per physician. For the workstation assignments, minimum and
maximum demand for workstations and a training plan are respected. This training
plan specifies which physician should be assigned to which department in order to
further their education. A specialty of this model is its capability to create initial
schedules as well as create an updated schedule based on an existing schedule. The
approach optimizes for five different objectives, of which four are quality objectives
and one is the stability objective: Physicians should be assigned to workstations
according to their training plan (training). Duties should be assigned according
to physicians’ preferences (preferences). During each planning horizon, the duty
workload should be equally distributed among all physicians (fairness). For all duties
and workstations, the demand should be satisfied (coverage). During rescheduling,
changes to the existing plan should be minimal (stability). Each objective is given an
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individual weight, which can be used by schedulers to rank the different objectives
in importance depending on their preferences or workplace culture.
Existing approaches for physician scheduling usually consider the duty assignment
and workstation assignment problems separately, i.e., use separate models for these
problems, which are then run sequentially. This means that the model which is run
first—usually the duty roster model—can not optimize for quality goals regarding
the other schedule—usually the workstation roster. This inevitably leads to an
inferior performance of the workstation roster in comparison with the duty roster.
The model presented in this contribution integrates the workstation and duty roster,
thereby allowing it to find the optimal trade-off between plan quality goals on the
workstation and duty rosters. To enable a comparison with sequential approaches,
both the integrated model and two separate (sequential) models to solve the problem
are presented.
The presented model is applied to data from an anesthesiology department at a
German university hospital. Two case studies are presented. In the first study, the
integrated model is evaluated with different cost settings for the trade-off between
plan quality and stability. The second study compares the integrated model with the
sequential models to evaluate the trade-off between quality objectives on the duty
and the workstation roster. For both studies, 50 instances of physicians becoming
absent are drawn. On each of the 28 days, a randomly drawn set of physicians is
marked as absent and the model is run on the respective day to create an updated
schedule for this day and the future, keeping the schedule from the past intact.
The first study evaluates three different cost settings for the model objectives. In
this study, violations of plan stability are weighted either LOW, BALANCED, or
HIGH compared with plan quality objectives. The following process is repeated for
each of the 50 instances. First, an initial plan is created using the integrated model.
A vector with 28 elements defining additional absences on each day of the planning
horizon is drawn randomly. Then, the integrated model is run on each day of the
planning horizon, incorporating the additional absences for this day. The model
is run once for each of the LOW, BALANCED, and HIGH cost settings. Results
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indicate that the LOW and BALANCED cost settings lead to worse performance of
plan stability than the HIGH setting because a huge number of duty and workstation
assignments are rescheduled. However, they perform better in terms of coverage,
training, fairness, and preferences as they are able to fulfill more quality goals by
reassigning more people on the schedule.
In the second study, the integrated model is compared with the sequential models.
50 instances are run and the following process is repeated for each of the instances.
First, an initial schedule is created using the sequential models. The absence vector
for the respective run from the first case study is used. Afterwards, the sequential
models are solved on each day of the planning horizon, incorporating the additional
absences on that day. For this study, only the BALANCED cost setting is used.
The results from the sequential models are then compared with the results for the
BALANCED cost setting from the first case study, which uses the integrated model.
The results indicate that the sequential models—with the duty roster model being
run first—can fulfill plan quality goals on the duty roster much better than the
integrated model. However, plan quality on the workstation roster created by the
sequential models is worse than on the schedule created by the integrated model.
Due to the sequential models being separate models, it is not possible for the model
being run first to optimize for quality objectives on the second roster. The integrated
model, however, performs worse in terms of stability than the sequential models.
Summarizing, this contribution proposes the first model for physician rescheduling.
It highlights the trade-off between plan quality and stability. Using the proposed
model, schedulers can influence this trade-off by selecting the appropriate weight set-
ting. Several weight settings and their outcomes on the trade-off are evaluated. For
an application in practice, the BALANCED or HIGH cost setting is recommended as
the LOW cost setting leads to an immense number of rescheduling operations, which
are often hard to execute in practice as each rescheduled physician needs to be noti-
fied of the changed schedule. Additionally, the use of integrated models for duty and
workstation rostering is recommended over the current practice of using sequential
models. Using an integrated model enables schedulers to weigh quality on the duty
roster against quality on the workstation roster, thereby resulting in better work-
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station assignments, which have a positive influence on the fulfillment of physicians’
training requirements. The work leaves opportunities for future research. The defi-
nition of the fairness objective is quite limited and could be expanded. Furthermore,
the model does not incorporate long-term fairness for the preference objective.
2.2 Hospital physicians can’t get no long-term
satisfaction — An indicator for fairness in
preference fulfillment on duty schedules
Gross et al. (2018a) investigate the long-term impact of fairness in preference distri-
bution. As existing work in physician scheduling only focuses on fairness within each
planning horizon, they propose a satisfaction indicator which is carried between plan-
ning horizons. Different strategies are evaluated to update the satisfaction between
planning horizons. Results of a computational study indicate that disregarding long-
term fairness can lead to unequal treatment of physicians which accumulates over
several planning horizons. This contribution has been published in Health Care Man-
agement Science, which is ranked in category A in the VHB-JOURQUAL3 ranking
(Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V., 2015). It can be found in
its entirety in Appendix B.
To ensure adequate medical care around the clock, a certain number of physicians
need to be present at the hospital at any time. During the day, physicians are
present to perform procedures and see patients, but during the night no procedures
are scheduled. Therefore, a duty roster is required to specify which physicians have
to stay at the hospital overnight, i.e., to be “on duty”. Due to the disruption of
physicians’ private lives caused by overnight work, schedulers let physicians specify
preferences for when they would like to be assigned to an overnight duty and when
they would prefer not to be assigned to any duty. As the creation of this roster is a
complicated task for a human scheduler, mathematical models and computer assis-
tance are often used to create the schedule. To ensure fairness among the physicians,
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most models try to maximize preference fulfillment among all physicians. However,
due to the placement of preferences, it is often impossible to achieve completely
equal preference fulfillment among all physicians, meaning some physicians will be
slightly disadvantaged. As existing models do not take into account fairness data
from the past, it is possible that the same physicians will be disadvantaged again
and again, leading to unhappiness and physician attrition in the long run.
This contribution proposes a satisfaction indicator, a number between 0 and 1, to
calculate how satisfied physicians are with a plan in terms of preference fulfillment.
For each physician, the satisfaction indicator tracks how many preferences have been
fulfilled per number of days in the planning horizon. This enables a comparison
between physicians, highlighting how well each physician’s preferences have been
respected in comparison to their colleagues. Based on the satisfaction indicator, it
is possible to calculate a satisfaction-based weight for each physician’s preferences
in the next planning horizon. This weight is selected in such a way that preferences
by physicians who have had many preferences fulfilled in the previous planning
horizon are now respected with a lower importance than those of physicians whose
preferences have not been respected as much in the previous planning horizon.
The approach describes a general physician scheduling model which assigns physi-
cians to overnight duties. The planning horizon for the proposed model is always
an entire month, i.e., 4 or 5 weeks. Physicians are assigned to duties based on their
individual qualifications. The model takes physician preferences to be assigned to a
specific duty or to not be assigned to any duty as an input. The model optimizes
for two main objectives: coverage of physician demand for duties and fulfillment of
physician preferences according to the satisfaction-based weight. While the model is
based on the requirements of an anesthesiology department, it is kept intentionally
generic as to be applicable to most departments. Furthermore, specialized con-
straints are not incorporated into the model in order to keep the complexity of the
model low and focus on the evaluation of fairness in preference fulfillment.
Three different strategies to calculate the satisfaction-based weight from physicians’
individual satisfaction indicators are proposed: The constant strategy (C) disregards
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long-term fairness by fixing the satisfaction-based weight at a constant value and
disregarding the satisfaction indicator. This is equal to not incorporating long-term
fairness in the planning process and is used to simulate the approach of existing
literature. The second strategy calculates the satisfaction indicator by applying
exponential smoothing after the planning horizon (ESA). Initially, the satisfaction-
based weight is set to a fixed value for the first planning horizon. Then, after creating
the plan for a planning horizon, each physician’s satisfaction indicator for the created
plan is calculated and smoothed exponentially with the satisfaction-based weight
from the previous planning horizon to arrive at the satisfaction-based weight for the
next planning horizon. Finally, the third strategy applies exponential smoothing
during plan creation for the respective planning horizon (ESD). For this strategy,
the satisfaction-based weight is modeled as a decision variable which depends on
the satisfaction indicator. Using this strategy, the model optimizes the satisfaction-
based weight along with the fulfillment of preferences to arrive at a solution with
minimal cost for preference violations.
For the C and ESA strategies, the proposed model is linear as the satisfaction-based
weight is modeled as a parameter. For the ESD strategy, however, the model be-
comes quadratic as the satisfaction-based weight is modeled as a decision variable
and is multiplied with the sum of preference violations—also a decision variable—in
the objective function. In order to efficiently solve the quadratic model, an equiva-
lent linear formulation is described. There can only be one preference per day, so
the amount of preference violations is bounded by the number of days in the plan-
ning horizon. As the value of the satisfaction indicator depends on the amount of
preference violations, it can only take on discrete values and only as many as the
maximum amount of preference violations. The amount of possible values for the
satisfaction-based weight is therefore bounded by the number of days in the plan-
ning horizon. Consequently, it is possible to pre-calculate all possible values of the
satisfaction-based weight for each physician, derive the costs induced by assigning
each amount of preference violations to each physician, and supply these cost values
as parameters. A new decision variable can then be added to select the appropriate
cost value and replace the quadratic term in the objective function. The model
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thereby becomes a linear decision model and can be solved as efficiently for the ESD
strategy as it can be for the C and ESA strategies.
In a case study, the three strategies are compared. To enable a comparison, two
performance indicators are defined. The APS indicator measures the variance of the
average of the satisfaction indicator per physician over all planning horizons. In other
words, when this indicator is smaller, satisfaction is more equally distributed among
physicians after several planning horizons. Small values of this indicator translate
to long-term equal preference fulfillment over all physicians. The ASV performance
indicator measures the average of the satisfaction indicator variance per physician
between planning horizons. When this indicator is smaller, the satisfaction for each
individual physician does not change as much from one planning horizon to the next.
Small values of this performance indicator indicate a stable level of satisfaction for
each physician over several planning horizons.
The models for each strategy are applied to data from an anesthesiology department
at a German university hospital. The data spans 24 months and the model is run for
each month. Afterwards, the satisfaction indicator is calculated and the satisfaction-
based weight is updated according to the respective strategy. This real-life data does
not contain conflicting preferences—i.e., several physicians requesting the same duty
on the same date—as workplace culture at the department dictates to avoid making
conflicting requests. Consequently, the models can rarely make a trade-off between
several physicians with the same request based on their satisfaction-based weights.
This is also visible in the performance indicators, which hardly differ between all
strategies. It follows that the strategies for fairness in preference fulfillment do not
have a high impact when there are no conflicting preferences which would require
trade-off decisions based on physician satisfaction.
In order to evaluate the performance for data with conflicting preferences, additional
data is generated based on the real-life data from the hospital. The data generation
algorithm takes the target conflict rate, i.e., the percentage of preferences which are
in conflict with at least one other preference, as an input. These are preferences
where at least one other physician has specified a preference for the same duty on
12
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the same date. The algorithm is run 11 times to generate data sets with the target
conflict rate ranging from 0 % to 100 % in increments of 10 percentage points. For
each of these data sets, the model is run for each of the three strategies for each of
the 24 months. Results indicate that the ESD strategy performs best in terms of
the APS and ASV indicator. This means that the ESD strategy is able to provide
both a more equal distribution of satisfaction among all physicians as well as a
more stable level of satisfaction over several planning horizons for each individual
physician. Furthermore, results show that the C strategy—no tracking of long-term
fairness of preference fulfillment—leads to a skewed distribution of satisfaction after
several planning horizons. For this strategy, the distribution of preference fulfillment
depends on the underlying solver implementation.
In summary, this contribution proposes an indicator to measure physician satis-
faction with a plan in terms of preference fulfillment. It illustrates how ignoring
long-term satisfaction tracking can lead to unequal treatment of physicians, which
accumulates over several planning horizons. A model is presented which assigns
physicians to duties while respecting their preferences according to three different
strategies: no satisfaction tracking (C), satisfaction tracking after each planning
horizon (ESA), and satisfaction tracking during model solving (ESD). As the last
strategy results in a quadratic decision model, an equivalent linear formulation is
derived. The proposed model is evaluated using data from a German university
hospital. Results indicate that satisfaction tracking is not effective when there are
no conflicting preferences in the data and therefore no trade-off decisions between
physicians with conflicting preferences need to be made. Additional data is gen-
erated based on the real-life data to evaluate the impact of long-term satisfaction
tracking when the data contains preferences. The model is applied to the generated
data and results show that the ESD strategy performs best for all performance indi-
cators. It is therefore recommended to implement satisfaction tracking over several
planning horizons and to do so using the ESD strategy. The work opens up possibil-
ities for further research. The definition of “satisfaction” is limited to the amount of
satisfied preferences for duties. However, there might be additional factors influenc-
ing physicians’ satisfaction with a plan, such as the equal distribution of workload.
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Furthermore, the general idea of satisfaction tracking could be applied to scheduling
in other industries or non-medical personnel in the health care sector.
2.3 Long-term workload equality on duty schedules
for physicians in hospitals
Gross (2018) evaluates the trade-off between long-term fairness in preference fulfill-
ment and long-term equal workload distribution. He proposes a workload indicator
to measure physicians’ workload during each planning horizon and explores different
strategies to update the workload indicator between planning horizons. In a com-
putational study, he finds that disregarding long-term equal workload distribution
accumulates to unequal treatment of physicians over several planning horizons. The
proposed model enables schedulers to manage the trade-off between long-term sat-
isfaction in preference fulfillment and long-term equal workload distribution. This
contribution has been published in PATAT2018: Proceedings of the 12th Interna-
tional Conference on the Practice and Theory of Automated Timetabling, which is
not ranked in the VHB-JOURQUAL3 ranking (Verband der Hochschullehrer für Be-
triebswirtschaft e.V., 2015). Additionally, this contribution has been submitted to a
PATAT special issue of Annals of Operations Research, which is ranked in category B
in the VHB-JOURQUAL3 ranking. It can be found in its entirety in Appendix C.
In order to provide medical care in emergencies, physicians are assigned to overnight
duties via a schedule respecting their preferences. In a previous contribution (Gross
et al., 2018a, see Section 2.2), a satisfaction indicator is introduced which ensures
fairness in preference fulfillment among physicians over several planning horizons.
This ensures that no physician is disadvantaged in the long term with regards to
preference fulfillment. However, some duties are not requested by any physician.
These duties still need to be assigned in order to satisfy physician demand during
the night. A policy usually employed for the assignment of these duties is equal
distribution of workload. However, as many physician scheduling models operate
14
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on a planning horizon of a single month, it is often impossible to achieve a com-
pletely equal distribution of workload within the planning horizon. Therefore, in
each planning horizon some physicians will be disadvantaged in comparison to other
physicians. If this disadvantage is not compensated in the following planning hori-
zons, it is possible that over a longer time span the workload of some physicians
accumulates to a much higher workload than that of other physicians.
In this contribution, a workload indicator to track the workload of an individual
physician in a single planning horizon is introduced. This workload indicator is
defined as the amount of overnight duties assigned to the physician divided by the
total number of days in the planning horizon. This is an approximation of the
number of overnight duties a physician is assigned per day. The workload indicator
is then incorporated in the physician scheduling model proposed by Gross et al.
(2018a). Based on the workload indicator, a workload-based weight is calculated
to guide the model towards assigning duties to certain physicians. Simultaneously,
the model takes into account physician satisfaction in terms of preference fulfillment
by using a satisfaction indicator and a satisfaction-based weight. This enables the
model to respect long-term equal preference fulfillment as well as long-term equal
workload distribution.
The model defines two types of strategies, one for each of these objectives. For long-
term fairness in preference fulfillment, the model offers the unfair (U) strategy, which
disables long-term fairness considerations and only maximizes preference fulfillment
in each planning horizon. The second long-term fairness strategy for preference ful-
fillment is the fair (F) strategy, which is equal to the ESD strategy proposed by
Gross et al. (2018a). This strategy calculates a satisfaction-based weight for each
physician based on the satisfaction indicator for the current plan and optimizes it
during model solving. For long-term equal workload distribution, there are also two
available strategies. The first strategy uses a constant workload-based weight (CL).
This eliminates all considerations of equal workload distribution. The second strat-
egy applies exponential smoothing to the workload-based weight from the previous
planning horizon and the workload indicator from the current planning horizon to
15
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calculate the workload-based weight for the current planning horizon during model
solving.
When running the model, one of each type of strategy—for fairness in long-term
equal preference fulfillment as well as for long-term equal workload distribution—has
to be selected. The F and ESL strategies both result in a quadratic decision model.
As the F strategy is equivalent to the ESD strategy described by Gross et al. (2018a),
the linearization described in that work can be applied to this strategy. For the ESL
strategy, a linearization is described in the contribution as follows. The amount of
assigned duties per physician is bounded by half the number of days in the planning
horizon as duties can at most be assigned any other day. As the workload-based
weight depends only on parameters and the amount of duties assigned in the current
planning horizon, it is possible to pre-calculate all possible values of the workload-
based weight for each physician. Based on the workload-based weights, the cost
values can be calculated which will be incurred when assigning a certain amount of
duties to a given physician. These cost values can then be added to the model as
parameters. An additional decision variable which selects the correct cost value can
be added and the quadratic term in the objective function can be substituted with
a linear term which adds the selected cost value. The model for the ESL strategy
can then be solved as a linear decision model.
To evaluate the model’s performance in terms of long-term equal preference fulfill-
ment, the APS and ASV indicators by Gross et al. (2018a) are used. Additionally,
the APL and ALV performance indicators are introduced to evaluate the perfor-
mance in terms of long-term equal workload distribution. The APL indicator is
defined as the variance over all physicians of the average workload indicator per
physician over all planning horizons. Lower values indicate a more equal distribu-
tion of workload among all physicians after several planning horizons. The APS
indicator is defined as the average over all physicians of the per-physician variance
of workload between planning horizons. Lower values of this indicator signify a
more stable level of workload for each physician between planning horizons. These
indicators are used to evaluate model performance in two computational studies.
16
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The first study uses data presented by Gross et al. (2018a) for the evaluation of their
model. This data is generated based on real-life data from a German university hos-
pital. The study uses only the data set with a 0 % conflict rate for preferences
and the unfair (U) strategy is selected for preference fulfillment. For workload dis-
tribution, the model is run for all 24 months of data with the CL and then the
ESL strategy. This effectively disables any optimizations for long-term fairness in
regards to preference assignment and only compares the strategy without any work-
load considerations (CL) with the proposed strategy for long-term equal workload
distribution (ESL). As the roster does not consider fairness in preference fulfillment,
the APS and ASV indicators are not evaluated because they only evaluate plan
quality in terms of preference fulfillment. Results indicate that the ESL strategy is
able to improve the values of the APL and ALV indicators distinctly in comparison
with the CL strategy. It follows that the ESL strategy can achieve a more equal
distribution of workload among all physicians over all planning horizons as well as
a more stable level of workload for each individual physician between different plan-
ning horizons. Next, all 11 data sets with varying conflict rate between 0 % and
100 % are evaluated with the F-CL and F-ESL strategy combination. However, none
of the performance indicators change notably between the different conflict rates. It
can therefore be concluded that the conflict rate of preferences and improvements
by the workload-based weight are not directly correlated.
For the second study, data with varying preference probability, i.e. the probability
with which a physician submits a preference on any given day, is generated. In
total, 11 data sets with a preference probability ranging from 0 % to 100 % with
increments of 10 percentage points are generated. As before, the models for the
F-CL and the F-ESL strategy combinations are run for all 24 months of generated
data for each preference probability and all performance indicators are compared.
Results indicate that the biggest improvements of the F-ESL over the F-CL strategy
for the APL and ALV indicators can be achieved on the data set with a 0 % prefer-
ence probability. Improvements then decrease with increasing preference probability
and converge to a small but still significant improvement for preference probabili-
ties of 50 % and higher. For the APS and ASV indicators, no improvements are
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possible for the data set with 0 % preference probability as it does not contain any
preferences, therefore optimization of preference-based assignments can not affect
the performance indicators. For data sets with higher preference probabilities, the
improvement in the APS and ASV indicators converges to a small but noticeable
improvement and remains at that value for data with preference probabilities of
50 % and more. The fact that no stronger improvement in any performance indica-
tors can be seen for preference probabilities over 50 % is explained by the implicit
limit on the number of preferences defined by model constraints: As duties can only
be assigned on non-sequential days, preferences can also only be submitted on non-
sequential days. Therefore, even if the probability to submit a preference on a day
is at 100 %, preferences can only be submitted at most on 50 % of days.
In conclusion, this work introduces an indicator to measure workload distribution
among physicians on duty rosters. The presented model incorporates this work-
load indicator into a physician scheduling model and integrates it with the satis-
faction indicator for long-term equal preference fulfillment. Two different strategies
for the calculation of a workload-based weight are evaluated: constant workload-
based weight (CL), i.e., no tracking of workload, and exponential smoothing of the
workload based-weight during the current planning horizon (ESL). As the model
for the ESL strategy is quadratic, a linearization for the model is provided. In a
computational study, the model is applied to generated data based on data from a
German university hospital. Results indicate that the workload indicator and the
workload-based weight derived from it are effective in ensuring an equal distribution
of workload over several planning horizons. The effectiveness of the workload-based
weight does not correlate with the amount of conflicting preferences in the data.
However, it does correlate with the amount of preferences and is more effective for
data with less preferences.
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This thesis comprises the three contributions presented above. Each contribution fills
a research gaps in existing literature. This section illustrates how the contributions
presented above can answer the following research questions.
1. How can existing physician schedules be adapted in case of unexpected ab-
sences?
2. How does rescheduling on physician schedules affect plan quality?
3. Does maximizing preference fulfillment on physician schedules during each
planning horizon ensure fairness in the long term?
4. How can long-term fairness in preference fulfillment on physician schedules be
guaranteed?
5. How can long-term equal workload distribution on physician schedules be guar-
anteed?
6. How does long-term equal workload distribution affect long-term fairness in
preference fulfillment on physician schedules?
Each research question is answered in a separate section below.
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3.1 How can existing physician schedules be adapted
in case of unexpected absences?
The problem of rescheduling physicians is a daily nuisance for many schedulers. Due
to the lack of literature, physicians are rescheduled manually, resulting in scheduling
overhead for the manual scheduler and suboptimal plans for the affected physicians.
While there is a huge body on literature on creating physician schedules, none of it
considers the problem of rescheduling physicians. Approaches for the rescheduling of
nurses exist, but cannot be used to create physician schedules, as physician schedules
are usually acyclic and require more diverse qualifications than nurse schedules. The
first contribution in this thesis (Gross et al., 2018b, see Section 2.1) explores the
physician rescheduling problem.
When rescheduling physicians, the resulting schedule should be of high quality. The
new schedule should therefore perform well with regards to the same objective mea-
surements which were applied when creating the initial schedule. Additionally, an-
other factor comes into play: Rescheduling physicians on a plan is simple, but in-
forming the rescheduled physicians of their new assignments is time-consuming. It is
therefore imperative to keep the number of rescheduling operations as low as possi-
ble. Any rescheduling model must therefore optimize for those two objectives—plan
quality and stability. The situation is further complicated by scheduling processes
which include the solving of several models sequentially, e.g., to first create a duty
roster and then a workstation roster. Not only does this process lead to suboptimal
schedules as the model run first can never optimize for objectives from the model
run second, it also further constrains the rescheduling problem: Rescheduling on the
roster which is created second might be facilitated by being able to reschedule on the
roster created first, resulting in better plan quality and lower number of rescheduling
operations overall.
The model presented in the first contribution allows the creation of an initial plan
as well as the rescheduling of this plan in case of unexpected absences. It enables
the assignment of duties and workstations to physicians via an integrated model,
20
3 Discussion of the contributions
thereby guaranteeing to find a schedule which is optimal for both types of assign-
ments. Plan quality goals as well as plan stability are incorporated in the model.
A case study illustrates its suitability for practical applications. The contribution
also provides a comparison between the integrated model and sequential models
and thereby illustrates how interdependencies between separate rosters can not be
respected when creating separate models and running them sequentially.
Summarizing, when creating an updated physician schedule, schedule changes should
be minimized. Simultaneously, the updated schedule should be optimized for the
same plan quality goals as the initial schedule. The contribution provides a model
which can be used to adapt physician schedules in case of unexpected absences while
optimizing for plan quality as well as plan stability.
3.2 How does rescheduling on physician schedules
affect plan quality?
In an ideal world, the schedule would be at least as good in terms of plan quality
after rescheduling as it was before. Realistically, this is impossible unless the initial
schedule had massive overstaffing which is then reduced by unexpected absences.
Most of the time, however, the initial schedule will not have a lot of overstaffing
and instead just cover the demand. In this case—assuming the initial schedule is
the optimal schedule—the adapted schedule will inevitably be of inferior quality in
comparison with the initial schedule. It has less resources to cover the same de-
mand and fulfill plan quality objectives as some physicians are unexpectedly absent.
Therefore, the schedule is more highly constrained than the initial schedule and no
model can ever find a schedule with higher plan quality than the initial one.
However, the plan quality objectives from the initial plan are just a part of what
makes a good adapted schedule. As each rescheduling operation on a plan needs
to be followed by communication with the rescheduled physician to inform them of
their updated schedule, rescheduling operations are costly for schedulers. A good
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rescheduled plan should therefore make the minimum number of assignment changes
possible. Rescheduling therefore should always optimize for plan quality in terms
of objectives defined for the initial schedule as well as stability in terms of a low
number of rescheduling operations. Unfortunately, a better fulfillment of plan quality
objectives often comes at the cost of a high number of rescheduling operations. It
follows that rescheduling models need to make a trade-off between plan quality and
plan stability.
This trade-off is modeled in the approach presented in the first contribution. The
presented model allows the scheduler to set cost values for plan quality and plan
stability objectives. According to these cost values, the resulting plan will perform
better in terms of quality or have less rescheduling operations. The contribution
explores several different cost settings in a case study. Results indicate that the
proposed model effectively allows schedulers to influence the trade-off between plan
quality and plan stability. The evaluation of the different cost settings shows that
rescheduling costs should be kept balanced with plan quality costs or even higher to
keep the number of rescheduling operations low and avoid communication overhead.
However, very high rescheduling costs also severely impact plan quality objectives
and might even lead to plans with insufficient demand coverage.
Summarizing, rescheduled plans are always at most equally good—but usually worse—in
terms of plan quality when compared with the initial plan. Rescheduling is always
a trade-off between keeping plan quality high and rescheduling operations low.
3.3 Does maximizing preference fulfillment on
physician schedules during each planning horizon
ensure fairness in the long term?
Physicians have to perform overnight duties, i.e., stay at the hospital over night,
which obviously interferes with their private lives. As physicians are a costly resource
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at the hospital and high turnover should be avoided, schedulers allow physicians to
submit preferences for when they would like to work overnight and when they would
prefer to be home at night. To keep physician satisfaction high, scheduling models
usually optimize the fulfillment of these preferences. This is often done by optimizing
some fairness measure, such as maximizing the amount of fulfilled preferences or
minimizing the amount of violated preferences. However, this optimization often
only tries to optimize the solution for the current planning horizon. It does not take
into account data from previous planning horizons regarding how many preferences
have been satisfied for each individual physician.
As planning horizons in physician scheduling are usually a single month or 4 to 5
weeks and due to the placement of preferences, it is often impossible to achieve a
completely equal distribution of preference fulfillment among all physicians within
one planning horizon. Some physicians might be a bit better off while a few are a bit
worse off, even though the model might try to maximize preference fulfillment. One
might argue that these random variations should cancel out over time and that after
several planning horizons it can be expected that all physicians have been treated
equally. However, this is not the case. The second contribution (Gross et al., 2018a,
see Section 2.2) investigates this problem. It proposes a physician scheduling model
which is evaluated in a case study over 24 planning horizons. The model tries to
maximize the number of fulfilled preferences in each planning horizon. Results of
the case study indicate that some physicians are consistently treated more favorably
than others when there is no long-term fairness guidance in the model. The selection
of physicians who are treated better seems to be based on underlying heuristics in
the solver implementation.
Summarizing, simply optimizing for maximum preference fulfillment within each
planning horizon will inevitably lead to small unfairness within each planning hori-
zon. This unfairness can accumulate over several planning horizons and heavily
skew the distribution of preference fulfillment towards a few physicians. To ensure
long-term fairness, fairness measurements need to be used which take into account
data from previous planning horizons to inform decisions on preference fulfillment
in the current planning horizon.
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3.4 How can long-term fairness in preference
fulfillment on physician schedules be guaranteed?
As discussed above, optimizing for maximum preference fulfillment within each plan-
ning horizon does not guarantee long-term fairness over several planning horizons.
Instead, small inequalities in treatment within individual planning horizons stack
up and lead to heavily unequal treatment in the long term. To counter this effect,
physician scheduling models need to take into account data from previous planning
horizons when creating a schedule for the current planning horizon. This data needs
to reflect the history of how well each individual physician was treated in the past
and must be used to guide decisions on whose preferences should be fulfilled in the
current planning horizon. Over several planning horizons, this leads to an equal
distribution of preferences among all physicians.
The second contribution (Gross et al., 2018a) proposes a physician scheduling model
and introduces a satisfaction indicator which quantifies how well an individual physi-
cian’s preferences have been respected on a schedule. The proposed satisfaction in-
dicator is always a rational number between 0 and 1 and approximates the fulfilled
preferences per day in the planning horizon. This indicator can be calculated for
each physician and each schedule. There are several strategies how this indicator can
be incorporated into the scheduling model: not at all (C strategy)—thereby creat-
ing schedules which are unfair in the long term—by updating it after each planning
horizon (ESA strategy), or by updating it during the solving of the model for the
current planning horizon (ESD strategy). In a case study, all three strategies are
evaluated to see which performs best in terms of long-term fairness. Unsurprisingly,
the C strategy performs worst as it disregards long-term fairness and creates sched-
ules which are highly unequal in terms of preference fulfillment after several planning
horizons. The ESA strategy manages to create schedules which have a more equal
distribution of preference fulfillment after several planning horizons, but with low
stability of satisfaction for each physician between several planning horizons. The
most equal distribution of preference fulfillment after several planning horizons as
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well as the most stable level of satisfaction between planning horizons is achieved
by the ESD strategy.
Summarizing, a measure of how well each physician has been treated in terms of
preference fulfillment in the past must be incorporated into scheduling models in
order to ensure long-term fairness. This measure must then be used to guide the
model towards granting preferences for physicians who have had less fulfilled pref-
erences in the past. The second contribution introduces a satisfaction indicator
which exhibits these features. In a case study, results indicate that the proposed
satisfaction indicator combined with the ESD strategy can achieve fairness in pref-
erence fulfillment after several planning horizons as well as maintain a stable level
of satisfaction between planning horizons for each physician.
3.5 How can long-term equal workload distribution
on physician schedules be guaranteed?
Another important objective when creating physician schedules is equal workload
distribution among all physicians. As discussed above, physicians can submit prefer-
ences for when they do or do not want to work. However, not all overnight duties are
requested by at least one physician, meaning there are several duties left to assign
without any requests for them. Not assigning the duties is not an option as their
coverage is required to ensure adequate medical care around the clock. Therefore,
a good policy for the assignment of these unrequested duties is assigning them in
such a way that the workload is distributed equally among all physicians.
A completely equal distribution of workload among all physicians is often impossi-
ble within one planning horizon. This leads to a slightly unequal distribution of
workload within each planning horizon, which may accumulate to a heavily unequal
distribution of workload in the long term. To avoid this behavior, a measure of
how much workload has been assigned to each physician on past schedules must be
incorporated in the scheduling model. This workload measure must then be used
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to ensure that physicians who have been assigned a high workload in the past are
assigned a lower workload in the current planning horizon. The third contribution
(Gross, 2018, see Section 2.3) proposes a workload indicator to track the workload
of each individual physician on a schedule. The workload indicator is defined as the
amount of overnight duties a physician performs per day of the planning horizon.
Two different strategies are defined for the evaluation of the workload indicator: No
long-term equal workload distribution or incorporating the workload indicator into
the model by smoothing the workload-based weight derived from it during the solu-
tion process. The latter strategy leads to a quadratic decision model, for which a
linearization is described. In a case study, the effectiveness of the workload indicator
in regards to equal workload distribution after several planning horizons is proven.
Results show that using the workload indicator leads to a more equal distribution of
workload among all physicians over several planning horizons as well as a more stable
level of workload for each individual physician between several planning horizons.
Summarizing, optimizing for equal workload distribution within each planning hori-
zon is not sufficient to ensure equal workload distribution over several planning
horizons. A workload indicator needs to be incorporated into the scheduling model
to guide the assignment of duties in such a way that physicians with a high workload
in the past are assigned less work and vice versa. The third contribution introduces
a workload indicator with these properties. A case study confirms that the use of
the workload indicator in the model ensure an equal distribution of workload over
several planning horizons.
3.6 How does long-term equal workload distribution
affect long-term fairness in preference fulfillment
on physician schedules?
As we have seen in the above sections, long-term equal preference distribution and
long-term equal workload distribution should both be respected when creating physi-
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cian schedules. However, a schedule that might be optimized for one of these objec-
tives does not necessarily have to perform well in terms of the other objective. It
is easy to see how these objectives can be contrary to each other: Physician prefer-
ences are often not equally distributed, meaning some physicians will usually request
more duties than others. In this case, optimizing for preference fulfillment would
obviously be detrimental to the equal workload distribution objective. On the other
hand, when there are no or only very few preferences to take into account, equal
workload distribution could be achieved more easily.
The model proposed in the third contribution (Gross, 2018) explores this trade-off.
It incorporates both a satisfaction indicator for long-term equal preference fulfill-
ment as well as a workload indicator for long-term equal workload distribution.
The scheduler is then able to assign weights to these objectives in order to decide
whether preference fulfillment or workload distribution is more important when cre-
ating schedules. As physicians usually care more about being assigned according
to their preferences than they care about being assigned to exactly as many duties
as their colleagues, the contribution’s case study evaluates a cost setting where the
cost for violating equal preference fulfillment is higher than the cost for violating
equal workload distribution. The model is then evaluated using data with a vary-
ing amount of preferences. Results indicate that the performance regarding equal
workload distribution is better for a low amount of preferences. With an increasing
amount of preferences, performance in term of equal preference fulfillment improves
while performance of equal workload distribution decreases.
Summarizing, long-term equal workload distribution and long-term equal prefer-
ence fulfillment are incongruent objectives. Depending on how the preferences are
selected, optimizing for one will harm the other. It is therefore important for sched-
ulers to decide how they want to make the trade-off between these two objectives.
The model proposed in the third contribution allows schedulers to influence this
trade-off using cost settings. A case study confirms that the long-term equal pref-
erence fulfillment and long-term equal workload distribution objectives optimize for
different performance measures and that this manifests more clearly the higher the
amount of preferences in the data.
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This thesis examines several aspects of the physician scheduling problem with consid-
eration of physician preferences. It motivates the need for research on the reschedul-
ing problem as well as the problems of long-term fairness in preference fulfillment
and long-term equal workload distribution. The main part of this thesis consists of
three contributions to literature. A summary of each of the contributions is provided
and the contributions are applied to answer open research questions introduced in
this thesis.
The first contribution introduces a rescheduling model for physicians. This is the
first model to support rescheduling of physicians in current literature. A case study
underlines the effectiveness of this model in making a trade-off decision between
plan quality and plan stability when creating updated plans in case of unexpected
absences. In the second contribution, a satisfaction indicator for physician prefer-
ence fulfillment over several planning horizons is proposed. Results of a case study
indicate that the use of a satisfaction indicator is mandatory to achieve long-term
fairness in preference fulfillment. The contribution proposes a strategy how this
satisfaction indicator can be included in linear physician scheduling models. After-
wards, the third contribution examines the long-term equal distribution of workload
on physician schedules and introduces a workload indicator. This indicator is effec-
tive in measuring the workload and the contribution details how it can be incorpo-
rated into physician scheduling models, together with the satisfaction indicator. A
case study explores how the trade-off between long-term fairness in terms of equal
preference fulfillment and long-term equal workload distribution can be managed
depending on the amount of preferences in the input data.
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The thesis poses several research questions which have not been answered by existing
literature. The first contribution shows how rescheduling can be implemented on
physician schedules. It further explores how rescheduling affects plan quality and
how to manage the trade-off between plan quality and plan stability. The second
contribution illustrates that optimizing for maximum preference fulfillment during
each planning horizon does not guarantee equal preference fulfillment over several
planning horizons. The proposed satisfaction indicator can be used to ensure that
created plans exhibit fairness in preference fulfillment in the long term. In the third
contribution, a workload indicator is introduced which is able to distribute workload
equally over several planning horizons. It examines the trade-off between long-term
fairness in preference fulfillment and long-term equal workload distribution.
The following opportunities for further research are opened up by this thesis. While
all contributions propose linear programming models, those usually take several
seconds up to several minutes to solve or are not solved to optimality. Depending
on the practical application, this time might be too long and heuristic approaches
should be considered, which are not investigated in this thesis. Furthermore, the
definition of preferences and workload could be expanded. Currently, each preference
has the same weight when considering fairness, just as each duty has the same weight
when considering workload distribution. In reality, physicians might want to be
able to assign different weights to preferences depending on how happy or unhappy
they would be with the preference being satisfied or ignored. Similarly, hospitals
usually have different kinds of shifts and duties to assign, which might be assigned
different weights for workload depending on when the duty needs to be performed
and how many hours it comprises. Physician education is only considered in the
first contribution, but no long-term considerations are included. Further work should
examine how physician schedules can ensure equal educational progress among all
physicians over several planning horizons. The proposed indicators in the second
and third contribution could be adapted for this task.
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Online rescheduling of physicians in hospitals
Abstract
Scheduling physicians is a complex task. Legal requirements, different levels of qualifi-
cation, and preferences for different working hours increase the difficulty of determining
a solution that simultaneously fulfills all requirements. Unplanned absences, e.g., due to
illness, additionally drive the complexity. In this study, we discuss an approach to deal
with the following trade-off. Changes to the existing plan should be kept as small as
possible. However, an updated plan should still meet the requirements regarding work
regulation, qualifications needed, and physician preferences. We present a mixed-integer
linear programming model to create updated duty and workstation rosters simultaneously
following absences of scheduled personnel. To enable a comparison with previous sequen-
tial approaches, we separate our model into two models for the duty and workstation
roster which generate plans sequentially. In a case study, we apply our integrated and
sequential models to real-life data from a German university hospital with 133 physicians,
17 duties, and 20 workstations. We consider a planning horizon of 4 weeks and resched-
ule physicians on each day for three different cost settings for the trade-off between plan
quality (in terms of preferences, fairness, coverage and training) and plan stability, re-
sulting in a total of 4,201 model runs. We demonstrate that our integrated model can
achieve near-optimal results with reasonable computational efforts. In each of these runs
our model reschedules physicians within 1 to 21 seconds. We run the sequential models
on the same data, but for only one cost setting, resulting in 1,401 runs. The results
indicate that our integrated model manages to respect interdependencies between duty
and workstation roster whereas the sequential models will always optimize for the plan
which is created first. Overall, results indicate that our integrated model parameters
allow managing the trade-off between plan quality goals and plan stability.
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1 Introduction
In recent years competition in the health care market has increased. This forces hospitals
to reduce their operating costs in order to remain competitive. Since personnel costs
make up almost 60% of a hospital’s total costs (Bölt, 2015), an easy way of cutting costs
is to improve personnel usage by scheduling staff more efficiently. This can increase staff
efficiency and reduce the number of required personnel. Therefore the problem of shift
scheduling for physicians has gained increasing attention in the last 30 years (Erhard
et al., 2016).
The task of physician scheduling is a complex one. This is due to the multitude
of different qualifications a physician can have and the need to service a hospital 24
hours a day. Different assignments may require physicians with different qualifications.
Additionally, physicians’ working times are bound by legal regulations, e.g., concerning
maximum working time and minimum staffing levels. Finding a schedule that meets the
demand for physicians of a certain qualification while simultaneously complying with said
legal requirements is a complex problem (Brunner et al., 2009).
As physicians are a scarce resource, hospitals have a high incentive to keep them
satisfied. An important factor in employee satisfaction is fairness (Stolletz and Brunner,
2012). One example to include fairness in physician scheduling is to enforce an even
distribution of unpopular shifts among all physicians. Another possibility of including
fairness in the schedule is providing physicians with the ability to influence the schedule
by expressing preferences for certain shifts or tasks. The consideration of preferences and
fairness further complicates the creation of a valid duty roster.
Existing work focuses on the creation of new schedules. However, already created
schedules often need to be adjusted. This frequently happens when employees assigned
to certain shifts become unavailable due to various reasons, e.g., illness. In this case
rescheduling needs to fill the gaps in the plan to make sure that staff demand is still
met. Poor rescheduling can lead to reduced quality of care, increased operating cost
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and sinking staff morale (Clark et al., 2015). Consequently, Petrovic and Vanden Berghe
(2012) find that rescheduling capability of a staff scheduling model is an important factor
in determining the model’s applicability in practice and Bai et al. (2016) conclude that
rescheduling of physicians is a promising future research area. Changes to the plan
induce significant management effort (Clark et al., 2014), e.g., because other employees
who need to be present in the unavailable person’s stead must be contacted and notified
of the changed schedule. To reduce this overhead, changes to the plan should be minimal.
Similar to Fügener et al. (2015), we differentiate between duties (i.e., assignments
where physicians have to work longer hours than regular) and workstations (i.e., concrete
workplaces where physicians work during their regular working hours). We propose an
approach to generate an updated version of both a duty and a workstation roster based
on a previous plan and incorporating additional, previously unknown and unplanned
absences. Our approach models the following trade-off. First, we want to obtain a high
plan quality for our roster as measured by the following goals. For duties we wish to
incorporate physicians’ preferences (either for a specific duty or for not being on duty
on specific days) and fairness (an even distribution of duties among all physicians). For
workstations we wish to consider training goals (to assign physicians to workstations
where they should work according to their training plan) and a good coverage of all
workstations (no understaffing according to minimum demand levels). Second, we aim
for plan stability, i.e., we try to minimize deviations from the previously published plan
as much as possible. We solve this problem using a mixed-integer program with hard
and soft constraints. Note that while we focus on absences, our approach could also cope
with changed demand constraints.
Our contribution is threefold. We believe that each part of our contribution closes a
different research gap. First, we propose an integrated model to simultaneously tackle
the problems of duty rostering (when does which physician have to work longer) and
workstation rostering (when does which physician have to work at which workstation).
This avoids local optima, i.e., each assignment’s consequences are always considered for
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both rosters. To our knowledge, we are the first to propose an integrated model for simul-
taneous duty and workstation rostering. We also create a sequential formulation of our
model which creates a duty roster first and a workstation roster afterwards for compar-
ison with the integrated model. Second, we propose the first approach for rescheduling
physicians in hospitals. Some approaches for nurse rescheduling exist (Clark et al., 2015).
However, they do not incorporate the trade-off between plan quality and plan stability
we described above. Third, we apply our model with data from a German hospital. We
explore different parameter values for rescheduling penalties where rescheduling (plan
stability) costs are LOW, BALANCED, or HIGH in relation to other plan quality cost
values and draw managerial insights. We believe we are the first to explore the trade-
off between plan quality and plan stability during rescheduling of physicians and during
rescheduling in the health care sector in general. Our data set is obtained from a Ger-
man university hospital with 133 physicians, 17 duties and 20 workstations. We consider
a 4-week planning horizon which contains 243 duty requests and 140 no-duty requests.
We first use our model to generate an initial plan and then randomly draw absences for
physicians on each day. Our model is then used to reschedule physicians on each day for
each cost setting. We run 50 iterations of this study, resulting in a total of 4,201 runs.
In this study we achieve good rescheduling results within 1 to 21 seconds. We compare
our integrated model with a sequential version of itself. The sequential models are run
on the same data set, resulting in 1,401 runs. The data shows that the sequential models
will always produce better solutions for the plan which is created first, whereas the in-
tegrated model allows fine-tuning the trade-off between different plans and between plan
quality and plan stability using cost parameter values. In particular, training aspects are
considered by far less in the sequential models even though they are of high relevance
for physicians and the attraction of the hospital. We suggest using the integrated model
with sufficiently high cost values for rescheduling in order to reduce rescheduling-induced
management overhead.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
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existing literature regarding physician scheduling. As no literature currently tackles the
problem of physician rescheduling, we discuss literature concerning the related problem
of nurse rescheduling. Section 3 introduces our mixed-integer linear programming model
for physician rescheduling and its sequential formulation. The performance of the models
is tested by a case study in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings and
discusses future research opportunities.
2 Related Literature
In this section we provide an overview of existing literature on scheduling and reschedul-
ing of nurses and physicians. Personnel scheduling has been a focus of research for several
decades. A recent literature review by van den Bergh et al. (2013) summarizes and catego-
rizes existing literature on personnel scheduling. Most literature on health care personnel
scheduling focuses on nurses. Burke et al. (2004) provide a detailed review of existing
nurse scheduling approaches. A smaller body of literature exists on physician scheduling.
For a more extensive overview we refer to Erhard et al. (2016). As to our knowledge
there are no studies in the OR/MS literature on physician rescheduling, we focus on two
directions in this section. First, we discuss relevant papers on incorporating preferences,
fairness, and training requirements in physician scheduling. Second, as no previous work
on physician rescheduling exists, we review the related, yet less complicated, setting of
nurse rescheduling.
2.1 Physician Scheduling
All research on physician scheduling has been published in the last 30 years, most of it
within the last 10 years (Erhard et al., 2016). In this section we focus on a few papers
that discuss either consideration of fairness and preferences or training requirements in
physician scheduling.
There are few papers that discuss fairness and preferences (for a discussion of fairness
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on a larger scope we refer to Bertsimas et al. (2011)). One possible interpretation of
fairness is equality of physicians, e.g., each physician is assigned to the same number
of overnight duties. Stolletz and Brunner (2012) discuss different measures of fairness,
such as equal distribution of on-call duties and working hours, in physician scheduling.
They compare the classical set covering approach with pre-defined shifts to an implicit
formulation, where shift generation is modeled as constraints. Shifts are defined as as-
signments of physicians to demand periods. Baum et al. (2014) discuss the assignment of
physicians in a radiology division under revenue and fairness aspects. They incorporate
fairness regarding revenue with a maxmin approach, where the value of the least well-off
is maximized. Besides, desirable and burdensome duties should be evenly assigned among
the physicians. The authors apply a mixed-integer program and demonstrate that their
approach allows significant revenue increases under strict fairness constraints. Gunawan
and Lau (2013) apply an approach where physicians need to give preferences for each
of their shifts. Using two different models, they assign duties to physicians so that the
number of unscheduled duties is minimized and physicians’ preferences are respected or
so that economic constraints are obeyed. Running their model on random instances,
they find that the model can find schedules with less than 3% of duties being unsched-
uled. Fügener et al. (2015) differentiate between duty and workstation rostering. The
authors discuss two separate models: The duty roster combines fairness (in terms of even
assignment of overnight duties) and preferences (of certain duty or no-duty requests),
while the workstation roster focuses on the connection to the duty roster (assignment
of all physicians on duty) and training requirements (assignments based on a long-term
training plan).
Some papers discuss training aspects. There is a subset of the physician scheduling
literature focusing on resident scheduling. Resident scheduling problems may be differ-
entiated into the long-term rotation assignment problem, the mid-term shift scheduling
problem, and the short-term task assignment problem. We introduce three papers that
discuss resident shift scheduling problems which are similar to our problem setting. Dif-
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ferent seniority levels, demand, and preferences for work-nights are discussed in Sherali
et al. (2002). The authors formulate a mixed-integer program and solve it exactly using
CPLEX and heuristically exploiting network structures of the problem. Three scenar-
ios representing different demand structures are analyzed. The authors conclude that
the best approach depends on the scenario. Topaloglu and Ozkarahan (2011) integrate
quality of training, resident well-being, and quality of care in a mixed-integer program-
ming model. They define hard constraints, such as regulations regarding working hours,
and soft constraints, such as hospital demand for residents. They propose a column
generation-based solution approach, where the feasible schedules are detected using con-
straint programming. On-call shifts during training periods and regular shifts of Oncol-
ogy and Hematology are assigned to residents in Elomri et al. (2015). As in the previous
paper, hard constraints, such as compliance with legislation, and soft constraints, such
as equal assignment of workload, are considered. The mixed-integer goal programming
approach can be solved with standard software within few seconds.
2.2 Rescheduling approaches in health care
While there is no literature on physician rescheduling, the problem of nurse rescheduling
has been addressed in a few publications. We summarize the most relevant articles in
this section, a review on nurse rescheduling is provided in Clark et al. (2015).
Most research in this area has been done in the past 15 years. As one of the first
researchers in this field, Moz and Pato (2003) tackle the nurse rescheduling problem with
an integer multicommodity flow model. In their succeeding research, they improve the
flow model (Moz and Pato, 2004) and later develop a genetic algorithm (Moz and Pato,
2007) to solve the problem. The models try to keep changes to the plan minimal but do
not consider the quality of the generated plan for the nurses affected by rescheduling.
Clark and Walker (2011) find that the acceptance of a schedule is tied to the real-
ization of nurses’ preferences for shifts. They therefore propose models that incorporate
nurse preferences to switch certain shifts. Depending on each individual nurse’s weight-
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ing factor, the model takes into account nurse preferences, nurse surpluses and shortages,
while also trying to minimize the deviation from the existing plan. Kitada et al. (2010)
tackle the nurse rescheduling problem with a recursive heuristic algorithm. When a
nurse becomes absent, they try to assign the next available nurse with the same skill
level and then repeatedly reschedule until the plan is free of conflicts. Instead of running
the rescheduling process when it is required, we could also run it cyclically. Bard and
Purnomo (2005) propose a model that is run every 8 hours. This decouples the model
execution start time from changes in the personnel structure, i.e., the model is not nec-
essarily run separately for each newly reported absence. The schedule generated by the
model spans up to three shifts, depending on how much the data changed.
We conclude that our approach is to the best of our knowledge the first paper dis-
cussing physician rescheduling, the first paper integrating duty and workstation rostering,
and the first paper considering training plans in workstation rostering. Even though some
articles consider fairness and preferences, none of the discussed studies include the pref-
erences, fairness, and training requirements simultaneously. Furthermore, we could not
find any literature discussing the trade-off between plan quality and plan stability as
described in our approach.
3 Model
We present a model to reschedule physicians on duty and workstation rosters. First,
we introduce our model and then explore similarities and differences to an approach by
Fügener et al. (2015).
Our model updates a schedule concerning a set of physicians j ∈ J during a set of
sequential weeks w ∈ W , with each week consisting of seven days t ∈ T . The number of
weeks to schedule is adjustable. Physicians are assigned to duties i ∈ I and workstations
h ∈ H. Next, we describe the logic of creating and updating rosters.
Our model defines a duty roster (decision variables xjiwt) which assigns physicians
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to duties on a given day. The model is usually run for an entire month, spanning 4
to 6 weeks. On each day, each duty has a certain demand d̄dutyit for physicians. Each
physician holds a set of qualifications, i.e., binary parameter Ephyje is 1 if physician j holds
qualification e. Each duty requires a set of qualifications of which at least one must
be held by the physicians to be assigned to this duty, i.e., binary parameter Edutyie is 1
if duty i requires qualification e. Physicians are considered qualified for a duty when
they hold at least one of the qualifications which are required by the duty. Our model
assigns physicians to duties according to their qualifications until the demand is met.
For example, let physician 1 hold qualifications 1 and 2 (Ephy1,1 = 1 and E
phy
1,2 = 1) and
let physician 2 hold qualification 1 (Ephy2,1 = 1). Let duty 1 require qualification 2 or 3
(Eduty1,2 = 1 and E
duty
1,3 = 1). Physician 1 is then qualified for duty 1, physician 2 is not.
Additionally, preferences for specific duties (parameters greq-onjiwt ) or for not being assigned
to any duty (parameters greq-offjwt ) and fairness (in terms of exceeding a maximum number
g24h of duty assignments per physician) are considered during duty roster creation.
Simultaneously, physicians who are present are assigned to a workstation on each day
via a workstation roster (decision variables yjhwt). To advance their education, physicians
are required to perform a specified amount of certain procedures. As the likelihood of
performing a procedure differs between workstations, it is in physicians’ interests to be
assigned to a workstation where they are likely to perform procedures which they still
require for their education. For example, to become an anesthesia specialist, physicians
need to perform, among other procedures, a certain number of narcoses on children. As
many children visit the hospital to have their tonsils taken out, the likelihood of perform-
ing a narcosis on a child is higher in the operating room where otorhinolaryngology (ear,
nose and throat, ENT) surgeries are performed. A provided training plan (parameters
gstationjhp ) gives priorities to which workstation each physician should ideally be assigned.
The model assigns physicians preferably to the workstations with the highest priority
in the training plan (with the highest priority being 1), then to the next-lowest prior-
ity and so on and afterwards to workstations which are not in the physician’s training
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plan. Continuing our example from above, physicians who still need to perform child
narcoses will be assigned to the otorhinolaryngology operating room in the training plan
with priority 1. This assignment in the training plan will then make the model prefer
assigning this physician to the otorhinolaryngology operating room during workstation
roster creation. Furthermore, each workstation has a minimum (parameters dstationht ) and
a maximum demand (parameters d̄stationht ) for physicians on each day. The dependencies





















Figure 1: Dependencies between physicians, workstations, duties and the respective
plans/rosters
To avoid local optima by considering the models sequentially, our model creates and
updates the duty and workstation rosters simultaneously. This avoids situations where
the sequential execution of separate duty and workstation models create problems for our
goals in the model which is run last. It is, for example, possible that the created duty
roster respects physician preferences and thereby creates duty assignments in such a way
that it is impossible for the workstation roster model to create a good solution respecting
the training plan. If several physicians which are assigned to the same workstation with
priority 1 in the training plan are granted a request for an overnight duty on the same day,
they will all be given a day off on the following day. This means there will not be enough
physicians with that workstation in their training plan present on the following day,
meaning the workstation roster model will have to assign physicians to that workstation
who are assigned to a different workstation in their training plan, thereby violating those
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physicians’ training plan. While we elaborate this argument only for preferences and
overnight duties, it is equally valid for 4-day late duties (see definition in Section 3.1) and
fairness considerations regarding duty distribution among physicians. Evidence of these
problems with local optima can be found in the results of our case study in Section 4.2.
The proposed model is loosely based on an approach by Fügener et al. (2015). We
highlight the major similarities and differences. Their approach also assigns physicians
to duties and workstations. However, they propose two separate models which leads
to problems with local optima as described above. The main additional contributions
of our model are its rescheduling capability and the integration of both models into
one. To enable a comparison of our model with sequential approaches, we also present
a sequential version of our integrated model in Section 3.2. The models discussed in
Fügener et al. (2015) only support the initial creation of plans. Should these plans
need to be changed, the planner was left with the choice of running the model again
and creating a new plan (which might be completely different from the previous plan) or
fixing undercoverage problems manually. Both options are undesirable. A large amount of
changes in the plan induces a significant management overhead and staff dissatisfaction.
Manual changes are not trivial and often generate a suboptimal solution, eventually
also leading to staff dissatisfaction because of violation of preferences or the training
plan. Our model enables the planner to reschedule physicians based on an existing plan.
The trade-off between plan quality and plan stability can be influenced by setting our
model parameters. However, our model still supports the initial generation of plans. We
provide the required parameters for initial plan creation in Section 3.4. Furthermore, the
formulation for the training plan is less flexible than in our model.
3.1 Model formulation
We now introduce our model. First, we explain duty categories and notation, then
the mathematical formulation of our model follows. Lastly, we discuss the terms of
the objective function and all constraints. Our model groups duties into the following
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categories:
4-day late duties (I late) These duties cover tasks after regular operating hours. They
are always assigned for 4 days a week with the fifth working day in that week being
a day off. This day off pattern is chosen because the late duty leads to a working
time of 10 hours a day. After 4 days of late duty, physicians have already worked
their regular weekly working time of 40 hours, so they are given the remaining day
in the week off to prevent overtime buildup.
Overnight duties (I24h) Overnight duties require the employee to be present at the
hospital overnight, resulting in a total working time of 24 sequential hours (i.e.,
eight hours of regular work followed by an on-call period of 16 hours). These duties
require that the employee is given a day off after their shift.
We use the following notation in our model.
Sets and indices
i ∈ I Duties
i ∈ I late ⊆ I 4-day late duties
i ∈ I24h ⊆ I Overnight duties
h ∈ H Workstations
j ∈ J Physicians
e ∈ E Qualifications/Experiences
p ∈ P Priorities
w ∈ W Weeks in the planning horizon
t ∈ T = {1, ..., 7} Days in a week
t ∈ T work = {1, ..., 5} Working days in a week
Parameters
T fixi ∈ T work day off for duty i ∈ I late
T offjwt 1 if physician j is absent on day t in week w, 0 otherwise
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Edutyie 1 if duty i requires qualification e, 0 otherwise
Ephyje 1 if physician j has qualification e, 0 otherwise
Xjiwt 1 if physician j is assigned to duty i on day t of week w in the
existing roster, 0 otherwise
Yjhwt 1 if physician j is assigned to workstation h on day t of week w
in the existing roster, 0 otherwise
t0 ∈ T current day
w0 ∈ W current week
greq-onjiwt 1 if physician j requests duty i on day t in week w, 0 otherwise
greq-offjwt 1 if physician j requests to be assigned no duty on day t in week
w, 0 otherwise
g24h Maximum number of overnight duties to be assigned to a single
physician in a single week
gstationjhp 1 if physician j is assigned to workstation h with priority p in
the training plan, 0 otherwise
d̄dutyit Maximum demand of physicians for duty i on day t
d̄stationht Maximum demand of physicians for workstation h on day t
dstationht Minimum demand of physicians for workstation h on day t
creq-on Cost for violating a request for a duty
creq-off Cost for violating a request for no duty
c24h Cost for assigning too many overnight duties to a single physi-
cian
clate Cost per day for not assigning late duty to a physician who is
assigned this late duty for the week
cstation-dem Cost per physician missing to satisfy minimum demand on a
workstation
cre-duty Cost for rescheduling assignment to a duty
cre-station Cost for rescheduling assignment to a workstation
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rduty Reward for assigning a physician to a duty
rstation Reward for assigning a physician to a workstation
rstation-planp Reward for assigning a physician to a workstation as planned
in the training plan with priority p
Decision variables
xjiwt 1 if physician j is assigned duty i on day t of week w, 0 otherwise
yjhwt 1 if physician j is assigned to workstation h on day t of week
w, 0 otherwise
zjiw 1 if physician j is assigned duty i ∈ I late in week w, 0 otherwise
∆req-onjiwt 1 if request by physician j for duty i on day t in week w is
violated, 0 otherwise
∆req-offjwt 1 if request by physician j for no duty on day t in week w is
violated, 0 otherwise
∆24hj Number of overnight duties assigned to physician j exceeding
g24h
∆late+jiw Number of late duties i assigned to physician j even though
physician is not supposed to do late duty in week w (zjiw = 0)
∆late−jiw Number of late duties i not assigned to physician j even though
physician is supposed to do late duty in week w (zjiw = 1)
∆station-demhwt Number of physicians missing to satisfy minimum demand for
workstation h on day t in week w
∆duty+jiwt 1 if physician j is assigned to duty i on day t of week w but was
not assigned to this duty in the existing roster (Xjiwt = 0), 0
otherwise
∆duty−jiwt 1 if physician j was assigned to duty i on day t of week w in
the existing roster (Xjiwt = 1) but is no longer assigned to this
duty, 0 otherwise
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∆station+jhwt 1 if physician j is assigned to workstation h on day t of week w
but was not assigned to this workstation in the existing roster
(Yjhwt = 0), 0 otherwise
∆station−jhwt 1 if physician j was assigned to workstation h on day t of week
w in the existing roster (Yjhwt = 1) but is no longer assigned to








































































































































∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I, w ∈ W , t ∈ T (3)
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zjiw ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W , w > 1 (10)
∑
t∈T work\{Tfixi }
xjiwt −∆late+jiw +∆late−jiw = 4 · zjiw ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I late, w ∈ W (11)
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xjiwt −∆24hj ≤ g24h ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W (13)
∑
j∈J





hwt ≥ dstationht ∀h ∈ H, w ∈ W , t ∈ T (15)




yjhwt ≤ 1− T offjwt ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W , t ∈ T , w > w0 ∨ (w = w0 ∧ t ≥ t0) (16)
Xjiwt −∆duty−jiwt +∆
duty+
jiwt − xjiwt = 0 ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I, w ∈ W , t ∈ T (17)
Yjhwt −∆station−jhwt +∆
station+
jhwt − yjhwt = 0 ∀j ∈ J , h ∈ H, w ∈ W , t ∈ T (18)
xjiwt = Xjiwt ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I, w ∈ W , t ∈ T , w < w0 ∨ (w = w0 ∧ t < t0) (19)













jhwt ∈ {0, 1}








hwt ∈ N0 ∀j ∈ J , h ∈ H, i ∈ I, w ∈ W , t ∈ T (22)
Our objective function can be decomposed into five subobjectives which can be grouped
into our two main objectives of plan quality and stability. Plan quality is described by
the following aspects.
Training Physicians should be assigned to workstations according to priorities
given to workstations in their training plan.
Preferences Physicians’ preferences for duty/no duty should be respected.
Fairness Workload should be equally distributed among physicians.
Coverage Demand for duties/workstations should be satisfied.
Plan stability is described by the following aspect.
Stability Changes due to rescheduling should be minimal.
In our objective function, we reward the assignment of physicians to duties and work-
stations in subobjective (1a) (coverage). Additional rewards are associated with the
assignment of physicians to workstations corresponding to the training plan (training)
in subobjective (1b). As the reward is specific to the respective training plan entry’s
priority, this favors training plan entries with a higher priority over those with a lower
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priority. Penalties are given for violation of requests for a duty and of requests for no
duty (preferences) in subobjective (1c). Subobjective (1d) penalizes assigning too many
overnight duties to a single physician in a week (fairness) and not assigning all days of a
late duty to the same physician in a week. The latter is a necessary modeling device as
absences may break the 4-day week assignment of a specific physician. Penalties are given
for the violation of minimum demand for a workstation (coverage) in subobjective (1e).
Our model also penalizes rescheduling of assignments (stability) to duties in subobjective
(1f) and workstations in subobjective (1g).
As we reward assignment of duties to physicians, constraints (2) make sure that we
cannot assign more physicians to a duty than this duty requires. Duties should also not
be assigned to physicians who do not have the required qualifications. This is enforced
by constraints (3). Note that with this formulation the physician only needs one of the
required qualifications. A formulation where all required qualifications need to be met is
straightforward.
Physicians can request a certain duty or request that they are not assigned to a duty
on a given date. To track violations, constraints (4) and (5) make sure that the respective
decision variables are set when a request for a duty (or no duty) has not been met.
There is a maximum of one duty per day for each physician. Also, physicians who
are not present cannot be assigned to any duties. Both of these conditions are enforced
by constraints (6). These constraints are limited to the current and future days. We add
this restriction to prevent the model from becoming infeasible in case data in the past
is entered incorrectly, e.g., a physician in the past is absent and assigned to a duty. As
we also fix the assignments in the past (see below, constraints (19) and (20)), this would
otherwise introduce an infeasibility into our model.
Overnight duties require that the physician be given a day off on the following day.
Consequently, we cannot assign this physician to a duty or a workstation on the following
day. Also, we want to make sure that the day off does not coincide with an existing
absence as this would lead to overtime buildup. This is guaranteed by constraints (7a)
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(for all days but Sunday) and (7d) (for Sundays). As it is possible that a physician was on
overnight duty and becomes sick today, we need to limit these constraints to the future
only. For the current day, we have to allow that the day off after an overnight duty and
an absence (due to sickness) are on the same day. To ensure that the physician is still
not assigned to a duty or workstation on the current day, we use constraints (7b) and
(7c) for all days but Sunday and constraints (7e) and (7f) for Sundays.
Late duties should be performed by the same physician 4 days a week. Constraints (8)
ensure that exactly one physician is given the late duty in each week. This prevents a
situation where multiple physicians are given the free day associated with the late duty
and also a situation where no physician is assigned the late duty and the single days of
the late duty are instead distributed among several different physicians. Note that we do
not limit these constraints to the future only. This is done to ensure that the variable
zjiw is also set for each week in the past, because this variable is required for the correct
computation of the ∆late+jiw and ∆late−jiw variables.
During each week of late duty, physicians should dedicate all of their time to the late
duty and not be given additional duties. To ensure this, constraints (9) make sure that
physicians on a late duty are not assigned overnight duties in the same week. Similarly,
constraints (10) ensure that physicians on a late duty are not assigned an overnight duty
on the Sunday before their late duty starts, as that would mean that their first day of
late duty coincides with their day off after the overnight duty.
As only one physician is assigned to the late duty in a week, there are two possible
deviations: not assigning all days to the physician on late duty and assigning days to
physicians not on late duty. Constraints (11) track both these deviations. We model
this using a soft constraint to cover cases where a physician who is assigned a late duty
becomes absent. In this case it should be possible to assign the remaining days of the late
duty in this week to another physician. The physician on late duty in a week needs to be
given a day off in this week. Constraints (12) ensure that the physician is not assigned
to a duty or a workstation on their day off and that this day off does not coincide with
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an existing absence.
Overnight duties are unpopular with physicians as they require physicians to be
present for 24 consecutive hours. In order to distribute overnight duties in a fair way
among all available physicians, we use constraints (13) to discourage the assignment of
too many overnight duties in a week to a single physician. This fairness measure was
chosen in discussions with scheduling experts at our partner hospital.
Similar to duties, we reward the assignment of physicians to workstations. However, it
might happen that we have more physicians available than are required to cover demand
of all workstations. We therefore use constraints (14) to make sure that the maximum
number of physicians to be assigned to each workstation is not exceeded. As we want
to guarantee that a minimum number of physicians is assigned to each workstation,
constraints (15) calculate the number of missing physicians on each workstation to satisfy
our minimum demand.
Physicians cannot be assigned to a workstation if they are not present. Constraints (16)
prevent these physicians from being assigned to a workstation. Similar to constraints (6),
we limit these constraints to the current day and future as the plan in the past cannot be
changed anymore. If past data is entered incorrectly, e.g., an absent physician is assigned
to a workstation, this would otherwise introduce infeasibilities.
Constraints (17) and (18) calculate the deviation from the existing plan due to
rescheduling. We use separate variables for positive and negative deviation (i.e., added
or removed assignments) from the previous plan. While our constraints do not require
the positive and negative deviation variables to not both be 1 simultaneously, this will be
taken care of during optimization as both variables induce costs when they are 1. These
variables are used in the objective function to penalize changes to the existing plan.
Obviously, rescheduling should not change plans from the past. Constraints (19)
enforce that the duty roster for all weeks before the current week remains unchanged,
whereas constraints (20) provide the same guarantee for the workstation roster.
Constraints (21) and (22) restrict the value range for our binary and integer decision
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variables, respectively. Note that it would be sufficient to keep these constraints for our
decision variables x, y, z and drop them for all ∆. The integrality conditions for all ∆ are
implicitly provided as the ∆ are constrained by integer variables and parameters.
3.2 Sequential models
We propose a sequential version of our integrated model to enable a comparison be-
tween existing approaches which use sequential models and our integrated model. This
sequential model is similar to the approach by Fügener et al. (2015). Here, we separate
constraints into two separate models for the duty and workstation roster. The duty roster
model is always run first, the workstation roster model is always run afterwards and has
to respect assignments made by the duty roster model. Unlike the integrated model, the
combination of these two models makes it impossible for the duty roster model to take
into account constraints and objectives of the workstation roster, such as the training
plan. We add new parameters Zjiw to the workstation roster to respect the free days of
late duties. In order to prevent infeasibilities in the workstation roster model, we add the
following constraints to the duty roster model:
zjiw ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I late, w ∈ W ,





These constraints prevent the duty roster from assigning a 4-day late duty week to a
physician where the free day is in the past and the physician had a workstation assignment
(and was therefore present) on that day. Without these constraints, the workstation roster
could become infeasible because we disallow changing assignments in the past but also
force the model to not assign physicians to a workstation on a free day of a late duty week.
Aside from these changes, the sequential models only contain constraints and variables
from the integrated model.
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3.3 Model limitations
Our models have limitations which we explore in this section. These limitations arise
from our desire to keep the models lean in order to make them easier to understand
for the reader. We provide ideas for alternative or extended formulations which could
mitigate these limitations. When applying these models in practice, most or all of these
limitations will have to be mitigated, together with customization of the models to the
specific application. As these mitigations and customization further obscure the models
with complicated and non-generic formulations which distract from the core idea, we
have chosen to not apply them to our model in this work. Note that the limitations are
mostly of a technical nature. Applying the proposed mitigations does not change the key
results we derive from the case study of our model. Some of these mitigations, however,
introduce new dimensions for parameters and might increase processing time.
In its current form, the models do not support week-specific demands for duties and
workstations. If required, this can easily be rectified by adding a week index to the
demand parameters d̄dutyit , d̄stationht , and dstationht . The input parameter for the training plan
gstationjhp is also missing the time dimension. In practice, physicians’ assignments in the
training plan change over time which may require adding a week and day index. However,
since these changes are infrequent (about 2 or 3 times a year) and we are discussing a
short-term problem, we omit it in our models.
Our models do not consider data outside of the planning horizon. This means that
overnight duties on the Sunday immediately preceding our planning horizon are not
considered when assigning duties on the first day of the planning horizon. It is therefore
possible that a physician is assigned two consecutive overnight duties. To mitigate this
in practice, data from the day before the planning time span needs to be provided as an
input parameter. Constraints (7d) need to be modified to take this data into account or
need to be supplemented with new constraints.
Fairness considerations in the models are currently limited to the maximum amount
of overnight duties to which a physician is assigned per week. This could be refined by
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adding a week index to ∆24hj to get individual values for each week. Furthermore, this
is a week-only measurement and does not consider equal distribution of duties over the
entirety of the planning horizon. As interpretations of fairness vary and are not the main
focus of this paper, we choose to not include additional fairness constraints. However, it
is trivial to add them to our models.
We limit ourselves to assigning only one physician per 4-day late duty. This is sufficient
for our application as the demand for late duties is always one in our case. If a late duty
with higher demand needs to be scheduled, our models support this by adding several
identical virtual late duties until the actual demand is met. For example, to schedule a
late duty with a demand of 3 physicians, add three virtual late duties to the models.
3.4 Creation of initial plans
Our models do not only support rescheduling but also allows for the initial generation
of plans by simultaneous consideration of duty and workstation rostering. They are
purposely formulated in a way that allows switching between initial plan creation and
rescheduling by changing parameters only, without the need to add or remove constraints
or objective function terms. To enable initial plan creation, the following parameters
need to be set:
Xjiwt = 0 ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I, w ∈ W , t ∈ T (24)
Yjhwt = 0 ∀j ∈ J , h ∈ H, w ∈ W , t ∈ T (25)
cre-duty = cre-station = 0 (26)
t0 = w0 = 1 (27)
This will make the models assume that the existing duty (24) and workstation roster
(25) are empty. Term (26) sets the cost of rescheduling to zero while term (27) sets
the current day to the first day in the planning time span. This means we start with
Appendix A Online rescheduling of physicians in hospitals
57
an empty plan, allow changes during our entire planning horizon, and do not punish
deviations from the existing empty plan.
4 Case Study
In this section we describe the application of our model at a German university hos-
pital with 1 200 beds. The focus of the case study is to analyze the trade-off decision
between plan stability and plan quality. Plan quality will be evaluated in terms of fair-
ness and preference considerations for the duty roster, and in terms of demand coverage
and fulfillment of training requirements for the workstation roster. Plan stability will
be evaluated in terms of duty and workstation reschedules during the planning horizon.
We consider a department of anesthesiology with |I| = 17 duties (|I late| = 11 4-day late
duties and |I24h| = 6 overnight duties), |H| = 20 workstations, and |J | = 133 physicians.
Unless otherwise noted, data used in this case study is real-life data from this depart-
ment. The planning horizon consists of four weeks, i.e., 28 days. In this horizon there are∑
j∈J ,i∈I,w∈W,t∈T g
req-on









jwt = 1,177 preexisting absent days. The number of absences
is comparatively high because our data set contains physicians which are absent during
the entire planning horizon due to parental leave, maternity leave, or vacation.
Each overnight duty has a demand of 1 for all days, while each 4-day late duty has a
demand of 1 for all weekdays. Detailed demand values for all duties (d̄dutyit ) are given in
Table 3 and Table 4 (Appendix). We display minimum (dstationht ) and maximum (d̄stationht )
demand of all workstations in Table 5. Maximum demand is the real demand from
the anesthesiology department. We automatically generated a slightly lower minimum
demand to ensure equal coverage of workstations in case of personnel shortage.
We automatically generate assignments with different priority on a training plan as
explained in Section 3 for all physicians. Each physician is assigned to three different
workstations in the training plan: one workstation with priority 1 and two workstations
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with priority 2 or 3.
We run two different case studies. First, we evaluate the trade-off between plan sta-
bility and quality for the integrated model with different cost settings in Section 4.1.
Afterwards, we compare the sequential models as specified in Section 3.2 with our inte-
grated model in Section 4.2. In both studies, we consider 50 instances where we randomly
draw a vector of absent physicians for each day of the planning horizon. Based on his-
torical observations, we assume the probability of a physician becoming absent on any
given day to be 2.5%. Thus, the duty and workstation roster is updated on every day of
the planning horizon, corresponding to solving the model 28 times. For the study of our
integrated model, each instance is solved with three different parameter settings:
LOW Plan stability costs are relatively low compared to plan quality costs
BALANCED Plan stability costs and plan quality costs are balanced
HIGH Plan stability costs clearly exceed those of plan quality
A summary of cost parameters is found in Table 2. All cost values are not absolute
but relative costs in relation to other cost values. Non-rescheduling costs are obtained
by testing real data and expert interviews with planners at our partner hospital. We
keep these costs constant for all different cost settings in order to evaluate the effects of
varying rescheduling costs only. With our cost settings, the cost of rescheduling a duty is
always higher than the cost of rescheduling a workstation. This is because a rescheduled
duty has a more substantial impact on the rescheduled physician’s life due to changed
working times, whereas a rescheduled workstation assignment only requires the physician
to work the same hours at a different workstation. The different rescheduling cost settings
were chosen in relation to the existing cost values. For the LOW setting we keep duty
rescheduling costs below duty/no-duty request violation costs in order to enable the model
to reschedule physicians to fulfill their duty requests. Similarly, workstation rescheduling
costs are below the workstation assignment reward. The BALANCED setting defines
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higher duty rescheduling costs which are above the duty preference and no-duty prefer-
ence violation costs, meaning this cost setting will not reschedule physicians because of
preferences only. However, workstation rescheduling costs are still below the workstation
assignment reward, making workstation reschedules possible. The HIGH cost setting de-
fines a very high duty rescheduling cost and a very high workstation rescheduling cost.
This makes workstation reschedules unprofitable for the model unless the reschedule ful-
fills a first-priority training plan assignment.
The non-rescheduling cost values have been fine-tuned for application at our partner
hospital via an iterative cycle of expert interviews. The rescheduling costs for our three
different cost settings are a recommendation on our part which we found by experimenting
with cost values and evaluating the generated plans. It is to be expected that all costs
will have to be adjusted for each application in practice. This is mainly because each
department has its own culture, specifying, e.g., how physician preferences and number
of overnight duties are weighed against each other. The cost values we propose should
only serve as a rough guidance when implementing this model at another hospital.
All computations are performed on an openSUSE 13.1 64bit system, kernel 3.12.59-47
with 10 GB of RAM and four virtual cores of an Intel Core i7-4700MQ processor with
2.40 GHz. The system is run as a VirtualBox 5.1.4 machine. All models are solved with
IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.6.2.0.
We report the average values of a set of key performance indicators over all 50 in-
stances. Regarding plan stability/rescheduling, we report the number of changed duty
and workstation assignments. Regarding plan quality for duties, we report the num-
ber of assigned duties (coverage), the number of declined duty/no-duty preferences, and
the number of deviations from the maximum number of overnight duties per physician
(fairness). Regarding plan quality for workstations, we report the number of assigned
workstations, the number of negative deviations from minimum demand requirements
(both coverage), and the number of deviations from the training plan assignments.
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Parameter LOW BALANCED HIGH
cre-duty 4 20 90
cre-station 3 10 30
creq-on 5 5 5
creq-off 9 9 9
c24h 5 5 5
cstation-dem 10 10 10
rduty 100 100 100
rstation 11 11 11
rstation-planp (p = 1/p = 2/p = 3) 30/20/10 30/20/10 30/20/10
Table 2: Summary of cost parameters for all three settings
4.1 Integrated model
We apply the integrated model as specified in Section 3.1 and discuss the results of our
case study. First, we create an initial plan using our model as described in Section 3.4.
Then we solve each of the 50 instances for all 28 days and all three cost parameter settings
resulting in a total of 1+50 · 28 · 3 = 4,201 model runs. Each model for updating a roster
takes between 1 and 21 seconds to be solved to a gap of at most 0.2% between the
solution’s objective value and the lowest known upper bound on the objective value for
all feasible solutions (optimality gap). In the following we report average values based
on the 50 iterations for all three cost parameter settings. The horizontal axis of all
figures represents the time in days and weeks starting at the beginning of our 4-week
planning horizon. The cost parameter setting LOW is displayed with a light grey line,
BALANCED with a dark grey line, and HIGH with a black line.
We present the values for the number of assigned duties and workstations in Figure 2.
These values represent the sum over all assignments in the entire planning horizon after
execution of the model on the respective day. We can clearly see that the number of
assigned duties and workstations decreases as time progresses. This happens because
with each passing day more people are absent due to our generated additional absences,
meaning physicians who were previously assigned to a duty are now absent. The same
logic applies to workstation assignments. However, the decrease in workstation assign-
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ments is more pronounced than the decrease in duty assignments. This can be explained
by the fact that present physicians are always assigned to a workstation and only some-
times assigned to a duty. When a physician now becomes absent, they will be removed
from their workstation, thereby decreasing the total number of workstation assignments.
As all other physicians are also already assigned to a workstation, it is not possible to
assign a different physician instead of the absent physician without also removing this
replacement physician from another workstation. It follows that, because all physicians
are assigned to a workstation, we will always encounter a decreasing number of worksta-
tion assignments when a physician becomes absent. For duties, the situation is somewhat
different. Most physicians are not assigned to a duty, so their absence does not pose a
problem for duty coverage. In case a physician who is assigned to a duty becomes absent,
there are still many other surplus physicians who are not assigned to a duty who can then
replace the now absent physician. The number of duty assignments is highest in the LOW
cost setting, followed by BALANCED and HIGH. This is a direct result of the different
rescheduling weights. All cost settings allow the model to reschedule physicians whenever
an uncovered duty can be assigned because the reward for assigning a duty is bigger than
the cost of rescheduling a duty (rduty > cre-duty). However, the cost of rescheduling a
duty is higher in the HIGH and BALANCED setting than in the LOW setting. It follows
that the amount of additional violations incurred by rescheduling a duty, such as too
many overnight duties in a week or violations of duty preferences, allowed by the model
during rescheduling is smaller for the BALANCED and HIGH settings than for the LOW
setting. Specifically: The HIGH setting will only allow additional violation costs of at
most 10 (rduty − cre-duty) during duty rescheduling, translating to, e.g., two additional
violations of duty requests (creq-on = 5) or one additional violation of a no-duty request
(creq-off = 9). Comparing this with the LOW setting, we find that the additional violation
cost incurred by duty rescheduling can be 96, translating to, e.g., 19 additional violations
of duty requests or 10 additional violations of no-duty requests. The argument is analo-
gous for the BALANCED setting. Thus, it follows that the LOW setting will reschedule
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duties accepting more violations of plan quality goals, thereby generating a better cov-
erage of duties. The HIGH setting, on the other hand, is more restrictive regarding
violations of other plan quality goals during rescheduling, leading to a smaller number
of duty reschedules and thereby leaving more duties uncovered. However, the amount of
uncovered duties at the end of the month is similarly small for all cost settings. Between
1 and 3 duties could not be assigned at the end of the month in comparison to the number
of duties assigned at the beginning of the month. The assignment of workstations does
not depend on the cost parameter setting. This is a result of the fact that all physicians
are always assigned to a workstation as explained above. It is not possible to increase
total coverage of workstations via workstation rescheduling as maximum possible cover-
age is already provided at the beginning of the planning horizon. As explained above,
it is then impossible to replace an absent physician on a workstation without removing
the replacement physician from a different workstation. This leads to the decrease in
workstation assignments over all cost settings, because the total coverage will go down
regardless of rescheduling. For workstation assignments, rescheduling can only influence
coverage of workstation-specific minimum demand and training plan fulfillment, which
we will explore later in the discussion of Figure 4.
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Figure 2: Average of assigned duties (x, left) and workstations (y, right)
In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we present the additional quality key performance indica-
tors of the duty roster and the workstation roster, respectively. As before, these values
represent the sum over the entire planning horizon, sampled after the rescheduling model
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for the respective day has run. The average of declined duty requests displayed on the
left of Figure 3 shows greater values for the BALANCED setting compared to the LOW
setting. This can be explained by the fact that lower rescheduling costs enable the model
to make more reschedules and thereby fulfill more requests while keeping the same num-
ber of duties assigned. The number of declined duty requests is lowest for the HIGH
scenario. All scenarios start from the same initial plan and preference fulfillment only
gets harder as the amount of absences increases. The HIGH setting only allows a com-
paratively small number of additional preference violations during rescheduling, thereby
keeping the number of preference violations approximately on the same level as in the
initial plan. The LOW and BALANCED scenarios, however, allow a higher amount of
additional violations during rescheduling, which then deviate from the initial plan. A
similar effect can be observed in the right graph, which displays the number of overnight
duties exceeding the maximum threshold for physicians. This number increases consider-
ably for the LOW and BALANCED settings, where additional absences in combination
with existing duty preferences and rescheduling shift the load of the overnight duties to
a small number of physicians. Smaller costs for rescheduling allow the LOW setting to
reschedule more physicians than the BALANCED setting, thereby achieving a slightly
more balanced plan. The rather constant values for the HIGH setting can be explained by
the lower number of reschedules compared to the other settings, leading to a distribution
that remains close to the initial plan through all rescheduling operations.
Both graphs of Figure 4, as before, show average of sums of the respective values
over the entire planning horizon, sampled after the rescheduling run on the respective
day. In the initial workstation roster, all physicians are assigned to a workstation which
respects at least one priority in their training plan. As time passes and the amount
of absent physicians increases, so does the undercoverage of workstations (left graph)
and the deviation from the training plan (right graph). Regarding the undercoverage
of workstations, there is only a slight difference between the cost settings, most notably
between the HIGH setting on the one hand and the LOW and BALANCED settings
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Figure 3: Average of declined duty requests (∆req-on + ∆req-off, left) and exceeding the
maximum number of overnight duties (∆24h, right)
on the other hand. This can be explained by the fact that the HIGH setting does not
reschedule physicians just to satisfy minimum demand of a workstation, thereby leaving
a few more workstations below minimum demand. For the same reason, the proportion of
workstation assignments not according to the training plan remains constant through all
rescheduling operations for the HIGH setting: It simply does not reschedule physicians
from a different workstation to the workstation with undercoverage but instead just
leaves the workstation below minimum demand. The LOW and BALANCED settings,
on the other hand, reschedule physicians to keep undercoverage in control. During this
process, it is unavoidable to assign some physicians to workstations which are not in their
training plan, simply because there are still open slots which need to be filled. Due to
lower rescheduling costs, the LOW setting manages to assign more physicians according
to their training plan than the BALANCED setting.
The graphs in Figure 5 follow a similar logic as previous graphs: Here, we show the
number of rescheduling operations which were made during the rescheduling run on the
respective day. This includes rescheduling operations which do not affect the respective
day but were made during the rescheduling run on that day. Note that workstations do
not have a demand on weekends, explaining the lower number of rescheduling operations
for workstations on days 6 and 7. These graphs clearly show us that the LOW setting
reschedules most physicians, while the HIGH setting reschedules the least. It is also visible
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Figure 4: Average of undercoverage of workstations (∆station-dem, left) and










j∈J ,h∈H,w∈W,t∈T yjhwt, right)
that the number of reschedules declines as time passes. This is a logical consequence
of constraints (19) and (20) which disallow changing assignments in the past: As time
passes, more and more assignments are fixed, resulting in a decreasing number of possible
rescheduling operations.
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Figure 5: Average of replanned duty (∆duty+ + ∆duty−) and workstation (∆station+ +
∆station−) assignments
4.2 Sequential models
For this part of our case study, we test the sequential version of the integrated model as
specified in Section 3.2 and compare it with the integrated model. As in the study for
the integrated model, we run 50 iterations of the sequential models. The same base data
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(physicians, duties, etc.) and the same absences are used. For this study, we use only the
BALANCED cost setting. As before, we first create an initial plan using the sequential
models and then solve the sequential models on each day of the 28-day planning horizon to
incorporate new absences for the respective day. This gives us a total of 1+50·28 = 1,401
instances of the sequential models. To enable a fair comparison, we solve both duty and
workstation rosters to the same 0.2% optimality gap we already used for the integrated
model study. The model to reschedule the duty roster is always solved within 1 second,
whereas the workstation roster rescheduling model takes up to 3 seconds. Data from the
previous case study is used for the comparison between the integrated and sequential
models. We discuss the key performance indicators of the sequential models in relation
to the integrated model in the following. The results from the sequential models are
displayed using a grey line, results from the integrated model are displayed with a black
line.
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Figure 6: Average of assigned duties (x, left) and workstations (y, right) for the sequential
and integrated models
Figure 6 shows the number of assigned duties and workstations summed over the
entire planning horizon after rescheduling on the respective day has run. It is clearly
visible and not surprising that the sequential models perform better in assigning duties.
During the entire planning horizon, all duties are always assigned. This result is to
be expected because the sequential models create the duty roster first, neglecting any
negative influence which the assignment of duties might have on the workstation roster.
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As the assignment of a duty also mandates the assignment of a day off and the sequential
models assign more duties than the integrated model, the sequential models will have
to assign more days off than the integrated model. Consequently, the integrated model
performs marginally better for the number of workstation assignments because more
physicians are available due to less days off. Considering the amount of workstation
assignments over the entire planning horizon after the last day of rescheduling has run,
the integrated model manages to make about 2 workstation assignments more than the
sequential models.
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Figure 7: Average of declined duty requests (∆req-on + ∆req-off, left) and exceeding the
maximum number of overnight duties (∆24h, right) for the sequential and integrated
models
As the sequential models always create the duty plan first, they are able to achieve
better values for the key performance indicators regarding duty plan quality. This is
visible in both graphs of Figure 7. Throughout the entire planning horizon, the number
of violated duty preferences in the integrated model is at about 200% of the value for the
sequential models. We find a similar picture for the violation of fairness: The number of
unfairly assigned overnight duties in the integrated model is at about 170% of the value
for the sequential models.
However, the sequential models’ focus on good fulfillment of quality goals for the duty
plan comes at the expense of the workstation roster. Figure 8 shows that the quality of
the workstation assignments, both in terms of physician training and in terms of equal
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Figure 8: Average of undercoverage of workstations (∆station-dem, left), the










j∈J ,h∈H,w∈W,t∈T yjhwt, right) for the sequential
and integrated models
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Figure 9: Proportion of workstation assignments conforming with the first priority in the
training plan (
∑
j∈J ,h∈H,w∈W,t∈T ,gstationjh,1 =1
yjhwt/
∑
j∈J ,h∈H,w∈W,t∈T yjhwt) for the sequential
and integrated models
coverage of workstations, is considerably worse with the sequential models. On the last
day of the planning horizon, both performance indicators are about 50% worse for the
sequential models when compared to the integrated model: The number of uncovered
workstations to satisfy minimum demand coverage rises from about 22 to about 30 while
the percentage of workstation assignments not according to training plan rises from about
0.1% to about 0.15%. Pictured in Figure 9 is the difference in workstation assignments
conforming to the first priority in the training plan: Whereas the integrated model can
make over 92% of workstation assignments on a workstation with priority 1 in the train-
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ing plan, the sequential models can achieve this only for less than 89% of all workstation
assignments. In other words, the proportion of physicians who are not assigned to a
workstation according to their first priority in the training plan rises from 8% to nearly
12%. Again, this can be explained by the fact that the duty roster model is run first.
Consider that there are several physicians who are qualified to do the same overnight
duty. However, they have different first-priority assignments in the training plan. The
integrated model will try to assign the physicians to the duty in such a way that the day
off after the duty coincides with a day where there are no open slots on the physician’s
first-priority workstation from the training plan, thereby maximizing the physician’s as-
signments to this workstation. The sequential models, however, will assign the duties
without taking this into account. The result is that the days off for some physicians will
be on days where there would have been open slots on their first-priority workstation.
Analogously, on the days where they then need to work, it is possible that there are no
open slots for their first-priority workstation, so they are assigned to another workstation
instead. Note that while this argument only considers overnight duties, it also holds for
4-day late duties.
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Figure 10: Average of replanned duty (∆duty+ + ∆duty−) and workstation (∆station+ +
∆station−) assignments for the sequential and integrated models
Lastly, we examine the rescheduling behavior of both models in Figure 10. The
number of reschedules for duties and workstations is always higher for the integrated
model. This difference can be explained by the fact that the sequential models do not
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respect interdependencies: Both duty and workstation model optimize for their own
objectives only. The duty roster model can influence the workstation roster by assigning
duties which require free days and thereby restrain the solution space of the workstation
roster model. The workstation roster model can not influence the outcome of the duty
roster model in any way. This lack of knowledge about the objectives and requirements
of the respective other model constrains the solution space to solutions which are local
optima, first in the duty and then in the workstation roster model. For this reason,
the sequential models perform less rescheduling operations because many constellations
where rescheduling would be beneficial to plan quality concern both workstation and
duty roster. These dependencies can not be respected by the sequential models. It is
therefore not surprising that the sequential models exhibit faster computation times as
they are two much smaller models which together form a decomposition of the integrated
model. The solution quality of the sequential models can not exceed the solution quality
of the integrated model as each optimal solution in the sequential models is also a feasible
solution in the integrated model.
4.3 Managerial insights
Some managerial insights can be drawn from the results of this case study. It should be
noted that the different rescheduling cost settings need to be considered in relation to
the other cost/reward values. Depending on the costs/rewards for different plan quality
goals, rescheduling will or will not accept violations of the respective goals. Using the
sequential models leads to a slightly better coverage of duties, but slightly worse coverage
of workstations compared to the integrated model. The sequential models better fulfill
physician preferences, but at the same time perform worse regarding physician training.
This is explained by the fact that the sequential models cannot respect interdependencies
between the duty and workstation rosters. They always create the duty plan first, leading
to a better fulfillment of duty plan-related goals. If cost weights were set in such a way
that duty plan-related goals are weighted much higher than workstation plan-related
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goals, the results of the sequential models and the integrated model would be much more
similar. While fulfillment of physician preferences is also important to physicians, they
usually value their training more. Additionally, hospitals have a legal obligation to enable
physicians to reach training milestones within a certain time frame. It is therefore also in
hospitals’ interests to ensure a swift advancement of physicians’ training. The integrated
model allows managers to influence how physician training should be weighted against
fulfillment of preferences, whereas the sequential model will always give a higher priority
to preferences. More generally, the integrated model allows weighing all different plan
quality goals (training, preferences, fairness, coverage) and plan stability against each
other. The sequential models, on the other hand, split these goals into two different
models and will always put more emphasis on the goals respected in the duty plan,
most noticeably preferences and fairness, and will inevitably neglect the training goal,
which only concerns itself with the workstation plan. We therefore recommend using the
integrated model.
In our study, we explore different rescheduling cost values for use with the integrated
model. Using too low cost values for rescheduling, as in the LOW setting, leads to a
large number of reschedules of up to 400% of the BALANCED results (see Figure 5).
While this does result in a few more (about 0.6%, see Figure 3) respected preferences
and a few more (0.2%, see Figure 2) assigned duties, the induced management overhead
of heavy rescheduling is prohibitive. The HIGH setting performs similar to the BAL-
ANCED setting in terms of reschedules and even leads to up to 50% less reschedules
than the BALANCED setting. However, it also leaves a few more duty (about 0.5%) re-
quests unfulfilled. In line with these results we suggest using the BALANCED or HIGH
cost settings. The decision over which setting is chosen should be made depending on
how costly reschedules and preference/training/coverage/fairness violations are to man-
agement. The rescheduling cost values we tested are based on the other cost values
we use. These other cost values have been fine-tuned in cooperation with our partner
hospital. It is possible and likely that these cost values will need to be adjusted based
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on the actual application of our model. Management should carefully monitor the cur-
rent requirements of their workforce. If, e.g., physicians complain a lot about regular
rescheduling (and attrition rises), management should focus more on stable plans by in-
creasing the cost values for stability. Analogously, managers should change cost values
for other subobjectives when required.
5 Conclusions
In the paper at hand we present a mixed-integer programming model that generates
high-quality updates of duty and workstation rosters. Unlike previous approaches, it
considers both problems simultaneously. Additionally, to enable a comparison with ex-
isting approaches, we present a sequential formulation of this model. We show that there
exists a trade-off between having plans with high stability (i.e., minimizing the number of
reschedules of duty or workstation assignments) and having plans with high quality (i.e.,
respecting fairness of duty distribution, fulfillment of preferences and training require-
ments, and coverage of duties and workstations). Thus, management should carefully
monitor the current requirements of their workforce to understand which quality or sta-
bility goals are central to physician satisfaction. Our integrated model allows managers
to control this trade-off between plan quality and plan stability of physician rosters by
changing the cost values. It further allows managers to control the trade-off between
quality goals: Besides the number of assignments (coverage), plan quality is measured in
terms of preferences and fairness for the duty roster, and in terms of demand coverage
and training requirements for the workstation roster. In a case study with 133 physi-
cians, 17 duties, 20 workstations and 383 duty/no-duty requests we simulate one month
based on real data and compare three parameter settings where rescheduling costs are
LOW, BALANCED, or HIGH compared to the remaining cost parameters. This gives us
a total of 4 200 rescheduling runs which can be solved within 1 to 21 seconds each. The
results demonstrate that a rescheduling logic that maintains relatively high plan quality
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with relatively few changes, i.e., good plan stability, is possible. We also demonstrate
the effect of cost parameters on the trade-off: in all cost settings, the number of assigned
duties only differs negligibly. The number of duty reschedules per day, however, is up to
more than 95% lower with the HIGH setting compared to the LOW setting.
Additionally, we evaluate sequential models which are based on our integrated model.
We run these models on the same case study data, resulting in another 1 400 reschedul-
ing runs. Using the sequential model separates our quality and stability goals into two
separated models, making it impossible to influence the performance in relation to our
goals by adjusting weight parameters only. The sequential models always put more em-
phasis on the goals which concern the model which is run first, i.e., the duty plan model.
This means that sequential models will always perform well for physician preferences
and fairness, because those are goals respected by the duty plan only, while at the same
time performing worse for the goal of physician training, which concerns the workstation
plan. Our integrated model allows influencing the trade-off between goals by adjusting
cost values and is therefore an improvement over sequential approaches, such as the one
proposed by Fügener et al. (2015).
Our work will enable hospitals to get timely decision support for rescheduling physi-
cians in daily operations. The case study analyzes a real-life setting, an implementation
in the staffing system at the partner hospital is currently in preparation. We believe that
approaches such as proposed in this paper may enable hospitals to improve physician
scheduling while maintaining good performance regarding preferences, fairness, cover-
age, training and limiting rescheduling of physicians (stability).
Our work has some limitations and offers room for future research. First, the defi-
nitions of fairness and preferences for duty rosters are quite limited. Especially fairness
might differ a lot between hospitals, and the perception of fairness by employees and
the planner might differ as well. Our paper defines fairness as equality - each physician
should not get more than a certain number of duty assignments. However, it might be
considered fair that a specific group of physicians (e.g., young physicians with stronger
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physics and at an earlier point in their career) are assigned to more duties than others.
Besides, fairness could be considered for longer time horizons. E.g., a physician that
had to do more duties in the previous planning horizon might get a bonus in the cur-
rent one. Preferences are currently unlimited, and each request for a specific duty has
the same value for the plan. Future research should analyze corrections to consider how
many requests physicians give, and may compute different values for different physicians
(e.g., physicians who got declined requests in the past might have a higher probability for
being granted future requests). The workstation roster considers coverage and training.
Regarding coverage, additional priorities over all workstations might result in better ros-
ters. For training purposes, all physicians have a number of priorities which in our work
remain static during the planning horizon. A dynamic view could incorporate different
combinations of workstations for the training plan.
While our rescheduling model manages to generate updated duty and workstation
rosters within 21 seconds in our computational study, this might still be too slow for some
applications in practice. Rescheduling is a daily task for many managers. When using a
computer system, managers should be presented a solution within 10 seconds if they are to
maintain thought continuity during resolution of the current rescheduling problem (Miller,
1968). As practice applications will likely necessitate the addition of more constraints to
our model, solution time will probably increase beyond our current measurements and
heuristic approaches might be required to find good solutions in acceptable time.
Currently most hospitals do not use any mathematical or software-based decision
support when rescheduling physicians. We are convinced that such approaches may help
hospitals to find acceptable solutions, especially in situations with a lack of resources and
where timely decisions are vital.
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A Appendix
i Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3: Demand d̄dutyit for overnight duties
i Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su
8 1 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1
11 1 1 1 1
12 1 1 1 1
13 1 1 1 1
14 1 1 1 1
15 1 1 1 1
16 1 1 1 1
17 1 1 1 1
18 1 1 1 1 1
19 1 1 1 1
Table 4: Demand d̄dutyit for 4-day late duties
Appendix A Online rescheduling of physicians in hospitals
79
h Mo Tu We Th Fr
1 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2
2 3
2
3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2
4 3 3
2 2
5 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4
6 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4
7 7 6 7 7 7
6 5 6 6 6
8 5 6 5 5 5
4 5 4 4 4
9 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2
10 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4
h Mo Tu We Th Fr
11 6 6 6 6 6
5 5 5 5 5
12 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4
13 6 6 6 6 6
5 5 5 5 5
14 7 7 7 7 7
6 6 6 6 6
15 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4
16 6 6 6 6 6
5 5 5 5 5
17 6 6 6 6 6
5 5 5 5 5
18 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2
19 7 7 7 7 7
6 6 6 6 6
20 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4
Table 5: Maximum (d̄stationht , upper row) and minimum (dstationht , lower row) demand of
workstations h
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Hospital physicians can’t get no long-term satisfaction – An
indicator for fairness in preference fulfillment on duty schedules
Abstract
Physicians are a scarce resource in hospitals. In order to minimize physician attrition,
schedulers incorporate individual physician preferences when creating the physicians’ duty
roster. The manual creation of a roster is very time-consuming and often produces subop-
timal results. Many schedulers therefore use model-based software to assist in planning.
The planning horizon for duty schedules is usually a single month. Many models optimize
the plan for the current planning horizon, without taking into account data on preference
fulfillment and work load distribution from previous months. It is therefore possible that,
when looking at a longer time horizon, some physicians are disadvantaged in terms of
preference fulfillment more often than their peers, simply because this generates better
results for the individual months. This may be perceived as unfair by the disadvantaged
physicians. In order to eliminate this imbalance, we introduce a satisfaction indicator
for preference fulfillment in physician scheduling. This indicator is computed for each
physician on each monthly plan and is then used to inform decisions regarding preference
fulfillment on the current and future plans. As a result, a more equal distribution of
preference fulfillment among physicians is achieved. We run a computational study with
three different update strategies for our satisfaction indicator. Our study uses 24 months
of data from a German university hospital and derives additional generated data from it.
Results indicate that our satisfaction indicator, combined with the right update strategy,
can achieve an equal distribution of satisfaction over all physicians within a peer group, as
well as stable satisfaction levels for each individual physician over a longer time horizon.
As our main contribution, we identify that our satisfaction indicator is more effective
in creating equal distribution of long-term satisfaction the higher the rate of conflicting
preferences is.
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1 Introduction
Hospitals need to be staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. During the day, physicians are
present to perform procedures and other tasks. During the night, however, no elective
procedures are scheduled. To ensure adequate medical assistance at any time, hospital
schedulers create duty schedules which specify which physician is on duty during the
night on which day. Being on duty mandates that the physician stays at the hospital
throughout the night and takes care of medical emergencies as they occur. It follows
that being on duty has a strong impact on the social life of physicians, as they have
to stay at the hospital after their working day for the entire night. Many schedulers
therefore let physicians specify preferences when they would like to be on or off duty and
incorporate them in the schedule. This enables physicians to plan their duties and their
social activities in advance and avoid collisions.
As physician scheduling is a complex task, there is a lot of research on automating
this process. Duty schedules are usually created on a monthly basis. Many scientific
methods for the creation of duty schedules therefore use a monthly planning horizon and
generate an optimal plan for the given month. These models take physician preferences
and availability as well as demand data into account and create a plan which conforms to
physicians’ preferences as much as possible. Additionally, many more constraints, such as
working time regulations on maximum working hours or minimum rest times, are taken
into account. A recent comprehensive overview on physician scheduling can be found in
Erhard et al. [10]. Depending on the preferences and the constraints, however, it is often
impossible to generate a plan which satisfies all preferences, meaning some physicians
will not be granted their preferences to be on or off duty.
The importance of creating a schedule that physicians perceive as “fair” was already
apparent to schedulers when designing the first computer-aided physician scheduling sys-
tems. Even though early systems could not yet create schedules on their own, they were
already programmed to enable comparison of, e.g., weekend duties between colleagues
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[11]. Later systems started incorporating rules to create fairness among physicians by
equalizing work load and distribution of weekdays [15]. However, even today, many mod-
els for the creation of duty schedules do not keep track of fairness indicators, such as
the amount of satisfied preferences per physician, over a time horizon longer than the
planning horizon. Instead, they just create an optimal plan for each planning horizon,
disregarding any information about how well individual physicians’ preferences have been
respected in the past. Depending on the preferences of the individual physicians, this
might mean that it is often the same set of physicians whose preferences are violated while
there is another set of physicians whose preferences are always fulfilled. As physicians
have access to the finished plan and often also to the preferences of their colleagues, it is
quite easy for them to deduce when colleagues have their preferences met while their own
preferences are violated. This observation will lower the disadvantaged physicians’ job
satisfaction and may lead to other adverse effects such as decreased motivation, increased
attrition, or higher turnover. Perceived unfairness has also been shown to contribute to
absenteeism [4]. Unfairness makes affected physicians unhappy, which leads to a nar-
rower attentional focus [21], meaning physicians will take more time in decision making
and have more pessimistic assumptions about the decision outcomes. On the contrary, a
plan respecting a physician’s preferences might elicit positive emotions, which contribute
to a wider attentional focus [12, 18], meaning a physician can rely more on their existing
knowledge and arrive at a decision faster. Furthermore, positive emotions stack up and
contribute to physicians’ emotional well-being in the long term [13]. Being the highliest
qualified personnel, physicians are very valuable to hospitals and high attrition rates due
to job dissatisfaction and depression are very costly. Managers therefore want to prevent
situations in which some physicians are treated unfairly. Instead, they want to ensure
equal fulfillment of physicians’ preferences.
In order to ensure fair consideration of physician preferences over several planning
horizons, we propose an individual satisfaction indicator for each physician. This indica-
tor models how well the physician’s duty preferences have been incorporated in plans in
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the past. For the creation of new plans, this indicator is used to weight the preferences
of each physician against those of the other physicians. Preferences of physicians with
lower satisfaction levels (i.e., physicians who have not had many preferences fulfilled in
the past) are given a higher weight than those of physicians with a higher satisfaction
level.
The key contribution of this work is the aforementioned satisfaction indicator. To
demonstrate the usefulness of this indicator, we develop a general scheduling model in-
corporating our satisfaction indicator. Our model is derived from a real-life scheduling
model which is currently in use to create physician schedules at the department of anes-
thesiology at a German university hospital. We apply our model to data from this
department and to generated data based on the real-world data in a study with three
different strategies: no satisfaction tracking, satisfaction tracking after every planning
horizon (past data), or satisfaction tracking during the planning horizon (past and cur-
rent data). Depending on the strategy, we incorporate our indicator into a mixed-integer
linear program (MILP) or a mixed-integer quadratic program (MIQP). We describe a
linearization of the MIQP to solve it efficiently and prove that it is equivalent to the
original program. Our experiments show that our satisfaction indicator, when used with
the strategy which mandates updating during the planning horizon, achieves an equal
distribution of fulfilled preferences among all physicians and also a comparatively stable
level of satisfaction per physician over a time horizon of 24 months. The impact of our
satisfaction indicator on equal distribution of preference fulfillment is more noticeable the
higher the rate of conflicting preferences is.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. As we describe a general physician
scheduling problem, we review related literature on fairness in personnel scheduling in
the health care sector in section 2. This is followed by our model and a review of our
different strategies for incorporation of the satisfaction indicators in section 3. Section 4
details the application of our model with satisfaction indicators to data from a German
university hospital and to generated data based on the real-life data. We summarize
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our findings and give recommendations for application of long-term fairness in physician
schedules in section 5.
2 Literature
There are many different interpretations of fairness when it comes to allocating resources
to different actors. For a diverse overview of different measures of fairness and how they
can be incorporated into Operations Research problems, we refer the reader to Bertsimas
et al. [3] and Karsu and Morton [20]. In a recent review of scheduling literature for
physicians in hospitals, Erhard et al. [10] conclude that fairness is often only implemented
for shorter planning horizons. In the following, we briefly present some approaches to
incorporate fairness into scheduling in the health care sector.
A very simple type of fairness is the ability of physicians to specify preferences for
certain assignments. This approach is implemented by a multitude of papers. A recent
example is presented by Niroumandrad and Lahrichi [24]. They propose a model for
scheduling tasks and physicians at a radiotherapy center. Creating a schedule is complex
because for each patient several tasks have to be performed in sequential order to prepare
the patient for radiotherapy treatment. The optimal schedule assigns all tasks to physi-
cians while minimizing patient stay at the center. Physicians can provide preferences
for certain task on certain days. As the model is quite complex to solve, the authors
propose a tabu search algorithm to efficiently find good solutions. An application of the
algorithm to real life data from a radiotherapy center shows that the generated schedules
provide shorter pretreatment phases for patients and therefore shorter patient stay than
the manually created schedules in use at the center.
A more refined definition of fairness is its interpretation as equal distribution of prefer-
ence fulfillment among scheduled personnel. Bard and Purnomo [2] schedule nurses using
a column generation approach. They allow each nurse to specify individual preferences
for when they would like to be scheduled to work. Instead of using a constant weight to
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penalize preference violations, they choose an exponential weight that increases with the
amount of violations. This ensures that no single nurse has to endure too many violations
and will instead make the model prefer solutions where several nurses have few violations
over a solution where a few nurses have many violations. Instances with realistic data
for a 4-week planning horizon could be solved in less than 4 minutes, obtaining schedules
with on average less than 0.3 violations per nurse.
A different approach is taken by Bowers et al. [5]. They segment physicians into
two groups: those who would like a schedule based on equal workload and those who
would like a preference-based schedule. All physicians agree on the workload assigned to
the duties which need to be scheduled. Afterwards, each physician can assign weights
to the different duties based on personal preference. The proposed model then creates a
schedule which distributes duties between the preference physician subset and the equality
physician subset, according to the number of physicians in each subset. Distribution of
the duties inside the respective subsets is then performed in such a way that duties are
equally distributed based on the collaboratively agreed-upon workload for the equality
subset of physicians and based on the individual preference values for the preference
subset.
Ouelhadj et al. [26] explore three different objective formulations and their effect on
fairness in nurse scheduling: minimizing all violations over all nurses, minimizing the
violations on the individual roster with most violations, or adding individual objectives
for each nurse to minimize violations on each individual roster. Additionally, they propose
a method to incorporate nurses’ individual weights for violations of different constraints
and detail a cooperative heuristic to find solutions for their scheduling models. Martin
et al. [23] improve upon their work and develop a new fairness objective measure which
punishes the worst individual roster quadratically. In a computational study they also
use a cooperative search heuristic, but combine all fairness formulations to get diverse
solutions. The fairness of solutions is calculated using Jain’s fairness index [19]. This
index divides the squared sum of all allocations by the sum of the squared allocations. It
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follows that the value lies between 1 and 0, with 1 indicating a 100 % fair distribution of
work. Results show that combining different fairness measures in the heuristic leads to
fairer solutions.
Cohn et al. [7] create yearly on-call schedules for residents at Boston University School
of Medicine. They focus on residents in their second and their post-graduation years. The
on-call schedule therefore needs to respect educational goals of these residents by assigning
them to different hospitals for a given amount of time. Note that this is different from our
model, which schedules physicians of all seniority levels and does not assign physicians to
a specific location to satisfy educational goals as the locations of our overnight duties are
not relevant to physician education. The approach considers different measures of fairness,
such as fixing the number of on-call assignments on holidays or number of denied vacation
requests per physician. Due to the planning horizon of one year, the model manages to
create a plan which the scheduled physicians perceive as fair. There is no mention in the
paper of any data from past schedules being taken into account.
An approach for long-term fairness in physician scheduling is presented by Gierl et al.
[16]. They measure the difference of duty assignment patterns between physicians. A
schedule is considered more fair if the difference between the assignment patterns of
different physicians is smaller. Or in other words: In an ideally fair schedule, each
physician would have the same assignment pattern. This equality is impossible to achieve
in a single planning horizon. Instead, information about the fairness of past rosters is
stored in a computer system and incorporated into the creation of plans in the future.
Their implementation is built on top of the existing “PEP” system [15] and enables a
significant reduction in secretary and scheduler working hours spent on creation of fair
plans.
Brunner et al. [6] introduce the flexible shift scheduling problem for physicians. While
their model does not incorporate fairness, Stolletz and Brunner [27] build upon this
work to enable the integration of fairness considerations. Their preprocessing algorithm
creates shifts of varying length and inserts breaks into these shifts. A model then assigns
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physicians to shifts, taking into account labor restrictions and minimizing overtime. They
show how the model can be extended to incorporate fairness. Fairness is considered in
terms of stable shift starting times within each week, an even distribution of working
hours, and an even assignment of on-call services. Computational results indicate that
incorporating fairness is possible at small cost. However, it increases solution times
considerably.
Fairness within each planning horizon is explored by Fügener et al. [14]. Their model
assigns physicians to overnight duties, similar to our work. In terms of fairness, they
set an upper limit of overnight duties per physician to keep the individual workload
under a certain threshold. Applying their model to data from a German university
hospital, they are able to generate schedules with less violations than those created by
the experienced scheduling physician. Gross et al. [17] add rescheduling capability to
this model. While both models respect physician preferences, they always just maximize
preference fulfillment in the current planning horizon. None of them incorporate long-
term fairness considerations for preference fulfillment.
Summarizing, there are many different types of fairness in scheduling in health care.
Among them are the sole existence of preferences, equal fulfillment of preferences, stable
shift starting times, and equal distribution of workload. However, existing literature
mainly focuses on fairness in the current planning horizon. In the health care sector,
work incorporating long-term fairness, i.e., fairness that takes into account data beyond
the current planning horizon, does not exist.
3 Model
Our main contribution is a satisfaction indicator which calculates a physician’s satisfac-
tion with a roster in terms of how many of their preferences are fulfilled by the roster.
Our satisfaction indicator is explained in detail in section 3.1. As the model is required
for the understanding of the satisfaction indicator, we first present a model to create duty
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rosters (decision variables xjiwd) for physicians j ∈ J who are assigned to duties i ∈ I
during sequential weeks w ∈ W , with each week having seven days d ∈ D. Our model
is similar in spirit to models proposed by Fügener et al. [14] and Gross et al. [17]. The
model is always run for an entire month, i.e., for 4 or 5 weeks. Note that almost all data
changes between the months. For reasons of comprehensibility, we do not add an index
for the month, as we would have to add this index to each parameter. Each duty has a
specific demand d̄dutyid for each day of the week. Note that this is the target demand and
is implemented as an upper bound on the number of assigned physicians, i.e., plans with
undercoverage are possible.
We distinguish between different duties. This is necessary because we need to ensure
an adequate experience mix during the night. To better understand what experiences
are required, we provide a quick overview of selected stages of physician education in
Germany. The 6 years of university education include a mandatory final unpaid clinical
year, which is comparable to the internship of the US system. The first employment
after university includes a training of 5 to 6 years in a clinical specialty. During this
time, physicians are working comparable to US residents (first 2 years) and senior resi-
dents (following year). The training is completed with the respective board exam. Then,
physicians work as specialists (e.g., anesthesiologists) and can practice independently. In
hospitals, they can train in further subspecialties (e.g., intensive care, pain medicine),
which is mostly a precondition to climb the greasy pole to a senior position with super-
vising duties, comparable to attending physicians in the US system. In our case, interns
are not scheduled for overnight duties. We ensure that there is exactly one resident, one
senior resident, another one who is in training for a subspecialty, one attending, and one
senior attending physician present at the hospital. Additionally, there is an emergency
medicine specialist on overnight duty who is on emergency call, i.e., responds to emer-
gencies outside of the hospital. In case of overwhelming workload, there is an additional
senior attending physician on standby (not present at the hospital) who can be called,
whom we do not schedule using our model. Important to note, the German boards re-
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quest that residents and senior residents are included in the overnight duties on a regular
basis to be accepted for the board exams.
We model these requirements by creating a different type of duty for each of these
types of physicians (except for the physician on standby). It follows that not every
physician can be assigned to every duty. Instead, physicians must be qualified to be
assigned to a duty. Additionally, schedulers do not always want to assign physicians by
only their qualifications, but also by other criteria. For example, some physicians might
be qualified to work as an emergency doctor, but are required at the hospital because
of their qualifications. In this case, schedulers would like to not assign these physicians
to the emergency doctor duty. We model this using binary parameter Eposjiwd to enable
schedulers to specify whether it is possible to assign a certain physician to a certain duty
on a given day.
We consider individual physicians’ preferences for being assigned to a specific duty on
a given day (parameters greq-onjiwd ) and preferences for not being assigned to any duty on a
given day (parameters greq-offjwd ). In Germany, physicians working at hospitals are directly
employed by the respective hospital. This is different from the system in the United
States, where physicians can have admitting privileges at multiple hospitals [see e.g. 25].
Duties constitute overnight or weekend work, which is incentivized by additional payment
for the time spent at the hospital. The payment scheme is very complex and defined by
collective labor agreements with unions. It is possible for physicians to earn up to 20 or
30 % of their monthly salary by performing overnight or weekend work. Priorities vary
between physicians. While some physicians are interested in the additional pay, others
are more interested in having their evenings and weekends off. In our experience, most of
the duties are requested by at least one physician. Consequently, only a few duties must
be assigned to physicians who did not request them.
Physicians can also be absent (parameters Doffjwd), e.g., on vacation, and thereby be un-
available for duties. Parameters ŝj contain information based on our individual physician-
specific satisfaction indicators from the previous planning horizon (see section 3.1). Our
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model is based on a real-life model we created for an anesthesiology department at a
German university hospital. The real-life model is currently in use at the partner depart-
ment to create monthly schedules. As the real-life model also assigns more than overnight
duties, we have removed parts of it to arrive at the model presented below. Due to the
generic nature of the resulting model, it is not restricted to anesthesiology departments,
but can be used for any department.
Sets and indices
d ∈ D = {1, ..., 7} Days of the week, starting with Monday = 1
i ∈ I Duties
j ∈ J Physicians
w ∈ W Weeks in the planning horizon
Parameters
α1 Weight for personnel demand coverage
α2 Weight for preference fulfillment
γ Smoothing constant for satisfaction indicator
ŝj Pre-computed value as an input to calculate satisfaction-based
weight for physician j based on the previous planning horizon
d̄dutyid Demand of physicians for duty i on day d
greq-onjiwd 1 if physician j has a preference for duty i on day d of week w, 0
otherwise
greq-offjwd 1 if physician j has a preference for being off duty on day d of week
w, 0 otherwise
Eposjiwd 1 if physician j can be assigned to duty i on day d of week w, 0
otherwise
Doffjwd 1 if physician j is absent on day d of week w, 0 otherwise
Decision variables
xjiwd ∈ {0, 1} 1 if physician j is assigned to duty i on day d of week w, 0 otherwise
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sj ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R Satisfaction-based weight for preferences of physician j for the cur-
rent planning horizon
σj ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R Satisfaction indicator for physician j. See section 3.1




0 Missing physicians to cover demand of duty i on day d of week w
∆req-onjiwd ∈ {0, 1} 1 if preference of physician j for duty i on day d of week w is not
satisfied, 0 otherwise
∆req-offjwd ∈ {0, 1} 1 if preference of physician j for being off duty on day d of week w
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xjiw(d−1) ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W , d ∈ D, d > 1 (8a)







xjiw,1 ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W , w > 1 (8b)
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xjiwd ≤ 2 · xWEjw ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W (10)
sj = 1 ∀j ∈ J (11a)
sj = ŝj ∀j ∈ J (11b)































jwd ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D (13)
sj, σj ∈ R+ ∀j ∈ J (14)
∆out-dutyiwd ∈ N
+
0 ∀i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D (15)
Our objective function consists of two objectives: Coverage of physician demand (1a)
and satisfaction of physician preferences (1b). We define a weight αi for each of these
objectives. This allows us to give different priorities to our objectives, which in our case
have been selected to be lexicographic, i.e., α1 ≫ α2. Constraints (2) ensure that we do
not assign more physicians than required and also set our deviation variables ∆out-dutyiwd
in case of undercoverage. Similarly, constraints (3) ensure that ∆req-onjiwd is set in case of a
violation of a duty preference while constraints (4) ensure that ∆req-offjwd is set in case of
a violated preference to be off duty. As a duty runs through the entire night and might
require the physician to work throughout, we cannot assign more than one duty per day
to a physician. This is ensured by constraints (5). Constraints (6) prevent the model
from assigning a duty to a physician who is not present at the day of the duty. Similarly,
we never want to assign physicians to a duty for which they are not qualified or who the
scheduler does not want to assign to this duty. We model this with constraints (7). Being
an overnight assignment, physicians should be allowed to rest the day after each duty.
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We therefore use constraints (8a) (for Tuesday through Sunday) and (8b) (for Monday,
d = 1) to ensure that no physician is assigned to duties on consecutive days. Duties on
the weekend (Saturday and Sunday) also put a lot of strain on physicians, so we do not
want to assign duties on consecutive weekends to a physician. Constraints (9) ensure that
we do not assign duties on consecutive weekends, while constraints (10) ensure that we
set the variables xWEjw indicating whether a physician is assigned to a duty on a weekend
in a given week. These constraints have been modeled based on real-life requirements at
our partner hospital, but other implementations are possible. Constraints (11a), (11b),
and (11c) are used for the different long-term fairness measures we propose. Note that
these constraints are conflicting, so we always have to include only one of them in our
model. We provide a more detailed explanation of these constraints and how they model
our different fairness measures in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Constraints (12) calculate the
satisfaction indicators for all physicians. These are only used by constraints (11c). For
all other strategies, we only use the values of these decision variables as a model output for
the evaluation of our results. Finally, constraints (13), (14), and (15) restrict the domains
of our decision variables. Note that some of these domain constraints are redundant and
could be dropped. However, we still include them in the paper to make the model more
comprehensible.
The main purpose of our model is the evaluation of our satisfaction indicator. It is
therefore kept intentionally simple. For example, we do not include constraints to ensure
equal distribution of duties which are not requested. We limit our model to constraints
which govern the distribution of requested duties, because we only evaluate the fulfillment
of requests. Additional non-essential constraints would increase complexity of the model,
hinder understanding by the reader and increase solution times. Nevertheless, our model
is practical and includes most of the specifications of our partner hospital.
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3.1 Physician-specific satisfaction indicator
In order to evaluate the plan in terms of granted requests for each physician, we propose a
physician-specific satisfaction indicator, similar to Alsheddy and Tsang [1]. This indicator
is calculated for a plan by dividing the number of granted requests by the number of days
in the planning horizon, i.e., the number of possible requests for a duty or no duty. The

























Theorem 1. The satisfaction indicator is always a fractional number between 0 and 1.
Proof. Physicians can only be assigned to at most one duty per day. Consequently,
physicians can only submit at most either one duty preference or a preference to not
be assigned to a duty on each day. The upper bound (UB) on requests of any kind
is therefore one per day. This is accordingly also an UB on the number of satisfied
requests. In the numerator of (16) we calculate the number of satisfied preferences over
the entire planning horizon, i.e., on |W| · |D| days. We therefore know that the UB on
the numerator is |W| · |D|. The lower bound on the numerator is 0 as we can only satisfy
(greq-onjiwd − ∆
req-on




jiwd = 0) each preference, or not have
a preference at all (greq-onjiwd = ∆
req-on
jiwd = 0), so there can never be a negative number of
satisfied preferences (analogous for greq-offjwd −∆
req-off
jwd ). It follows that 0 ≤ σj ≤ 1.
The higher a physician’s satisfaction indicator, the higher his satisfaction with the
respective plan. A satisfaction indicator of 1 indicates that the physician has entered a
preference on each day and all of these preferences were satisfied. Note that this can only
be the case when the preferences entered by the physician do not contain consecutive duty
preferences. This means that a duty preference can be entered at most on alternating
days and on all other days a preference to not be assigned to any duty must be entered.
A satisfaction indicator of 0 indicates that not a single preference of the physician has
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been satisfied. This can be either because the physician entered preferences and they were
ignored or because the physician did not enter any preferences. Note that our satisfaction
indicator only counts satisfied preferences, so unsatisfied and missing preferences are
treated the same way. By not adding a penalty to the satisfaction indicator for submitted
but unsatisfied preferences, we prevent physicians from gaming the system. Otherwise,
it would be possible for physicians to create requests which are hard or impossible to
satisfy in order to decrease their satisfaction indicator and therefore get a higher weight
for their preferences in the next planning horizon [1].
3.2 Updating strategies for satisfaction-based weights
The satisfaction indicator on its own is not helpful in generating fairer plans. We need
to incorporate it into the planning process and then favor preferences of physicians with
a lower satisfaction over preferences of physicians with a higher satisfaction. In order
to do this, we punish each physician’s preference violations with a cost based on the
satisfaction indicator. In our model, we have chosen this cost as α2 · (2 − sj), with sj
being a satisfaction-based weight for the preferences of physician j. Our different updating
strategies describe different ways to calculate this weight. Note that this weight is based
on the satisfaction indicator and all strategies ensure that 0 ≤ sj ≤ 1. We choose the
constant 2 to evaluate different strategies. The only requirement for this constant is that
it is greater than 1, because a constant smaller than 1 will result in zero or negative cost
values for certain values of sj. By adjusting this constant in combination with α2, the
scheduler can influence the impact of the satisfaction-based weight on the total weight
for preference fulfillment. Higher values for the constant and lower values for α2, for
example, would keep the impact of preferences in comparison to other objectives about
the same, but would decrease the impact of the satisfaction-based weight on the objective
function.
When running the model, we supply a pre-calculated value for the historical satis-
faction ŝj. Depending on the strategy, this value is calculated differently and usually
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depends on the historical satisfaction of the previous month’s schedule. For all strate-
gies, we initialize this value to 1 before the first planning horizon and test three separate
updating strategies for the satisfaction-based weight:
I. Constant (C) Satisfaction-based weight is fixed at sj = 1 for each physician, thereby
giving all physicians’ preferences the same weight in each planning horizon. Note
that this means that the weight for each preference is α2 · (2 − sj) = α2 = 1 (see
objective term (1b)). We use constraints (11a) for this experiment and do not
supply parameters ŝj.
II. Exponential smoothing after the planning horizon (ESA) We calculate the
satisfaction indicator σj for the generated plan after each planning horizon. Af-
terwards, we apply exponential smoothing to the satisfaction indicator and the
historical satisfaction from the plan (i.e., the value we supplied as parameters ŝj
to the scheduling model to create the plan, now denoted as ŝ0j) using smoothing
constant γ. The resulting value is used as the historical satisfaction ŝj for the
next planning horizon. For this experiment, we use constraints (11b) and calculate
parameters ŝj for the following planning horizon as follows.
ŝj = γ · σj + (1− γ) · ŝ0j
III. Exponential smoothing during the planning horizon (ESD) We update our
satisfaction-based weight directly in the model using exponential smoothing for the
satisfaction indicator of the plan currently being generated and the satisfaction-
based weight from the previous planning horizon. This will give us an updated
satisfaction-based weight which we store in our decision variables sj. This way, the
satisfaction-based weight for preferences is already updated during assignment of
the duties in the current planning horizon and the model will react to changes in the
satisfaction indicator directly and not only after the planning horizon. For the next
planning horizon, we look at the value of the satisfaction-based weight as output
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by the model in decision variables sj. We now denote this value as s0j and supply
it as the historical satisfaction ŝj to the model for the next planning horizon. This
experiment is conducted using constraints (11c) and results in a quadratic decision




Note that the complexity of our model is different between our three updating strate-
gies. For the C and ESA strategies, the value of our satisfaction-based weight does not
change during the solving of the model. We can therefore model our satisfaction-based
weights sj as parameters, resulting in a linear decision model. For our ESD strategy,
however, we change the value of the satisfaction-based weights based on the assigned
duties during the solving of the model. Therefore, our satisfaction-based weights must
also be modeled as decision variables. As we use our satisfaction indicator, which changes
during model solving, to weight the fulfillment of preferences, we are left with a quadratic
decision model.
3.3 Linearization of the ESD model
As solving a MIQP is much harder than solving a MILP, we provide a linearization
of our quadratic model for the ESD strategy which yields equivalent results. For this
linearization, we exploit properties of our problem. We know from (11c) that the value
of the satisfaction-based weight sj for the ESD strategy depends on some parameters















i.e., the sum of preference violations in the planning horizon for physician j. As all other
values are parameters and therefore fixed during model solving, we only need to think
about what possible values the sum of the preference violations could assume. If we then
pre-compute sj for each of these values, we can supply these values of sj as parameters
and have the model select between one of these values.
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We define that a physician can have at most one preference per day, either for a
specific duty or for not being assigned to any duty. Allowing several preferences on a day
does not make a lot of sense as most physicians are not qualified for more than one duty,
meaning the only possible combination of preferences for them would be a preference
for that duty and a preference for not being assigned to any duty. However, as those
are also the only two possible outcomes, they would have then submitted preferences for
any possible outcome, rendering the preference ineffective. The only case where multiple
preferences could have a useful application would be a physician who is qualified for two
duties A and B. They could then, for example, submit a preference for duty A and a
preference for not being assigned to any duty, hoping to avoid being assigned to duty B.
However, since we do not see the necessity for such a special way of using preferences, we
decide to limit our preferences to one per day. Note that all further arguments made in
this section are still valid for a higher limit of preferences per day. The only difference is
that the upper bound on preference violations will need to be multiplied with the amount
of preferences per day.
We first simplify the value for sj from (11c). With some transformation, we can write
(11c) as follows.
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Substituting these, we arrive at the following equation.
sj = k̃ · wj + h̃j (17)
Note that k̃ and h̃j only consist of parameters and can be modeled as parameters,
whereas wj is an integer decision variable. Inserting this value for sj into our cost term




























Recall that h̃j and k̃ are parameters, so they can be treated as constants as they
will never change their values during model solving. As wj is a sum of binary decision
variables, it can only be a natural number, i.e., all possible values of wj are countable.
We can therefore introduce parameters cjwj for all physicians j and possible values of wj,
giving us the cost incurred by the preference violations of physician j. As wj describes
the number of violations of preferences for physician j, it is bounded by |W| · |D|. This
is easily explained: Assuming an upper limit of one preference per physician per day,
our plan can violate at most this number of preferences for each physician. At the other
extreme, the generated plan could violate no preferences at all. The possible values for
the number of preference violations are therefore in V = {0, . . . , |W| · |D|}. As we can
always only satisfy or violate a preference, this set has to be a subset of the set of natural
numbers. Using this set V , we can now calculate |V| violation-based cost values cjv for
each physician j and denote the number of violations with v ∈ V .
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These cost values can now be supplied as parameters to our model. In our objective
function, we now only need to select the appropriate cost values based on the number
of violations. To this end, we introduce a new binary decision variable yjv which is 1 if
physician j has exactly v violations of preferences in the current planning horizon and 0
otherwise. Using this new decision variable, we can substitute term (1b) in our objective





(cjv · yjv) (19)
Additionally, we add the following constraints to the model.
∑
v∈V















(v · yjv) ∀j ∈ J (21)
Term (19) adds the cost calculated for the satisfaction-based weight to the objective
function and replaces the non-linear term (1b). Constraints (20) ensure that we set
decision variables yjv to 1 for exactly one number of violations v per physician. This
ensures that we will always select exactly one amount of violations for each physician.
Constraints (21) make sure we select yjv in such a way that it describes the correct amount
of violations.
Theorem 2. For each physician, the selected pre-calculated cost values for preference



















Proof. We know from constraints (20) that for all values of v, there can only be one value
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of yjv per physician j which is 1, while all others will be 0. We denote this value of v as wj.













jwd and can therefore write the equation as follows.
cjwj = α2 · (2− sj) · wj ∀j ∈ J
Using equation 17 and equation 18, we can substitute to arrive at the following equation















k̃ · wj + h̃j
))
· wj ∀j ∈ J
Theorem 3. The cost induced by preference violations in the linearized model is equal to
























Proof. According to theorem 2, we know that the cost values for individual physicians in
the linearized model are equal to those in the quadratic model. It is therefore trivial to
see that the sum over all physicians j must also show this equality.
With these modifications to our model, we now have an exact MILP for the ESD
strategy. This model is provably equivalent in the objective function regarding physician
preference violations. In summary, the models for all our strategies are now linear decision
models and can be solved by any MILP solver.
4 Case Study
We use our satisfaction indicator σj as presented in (16) to quantify individual physicians’
satisfaction with a schedule. As each schedule spans a month (4 or 5 weeks) and we need
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to calculate the satisfaction indicator for each schedule, we add an index m ∈ M to σj,
with M being the set of all months in our study, and define σjm as the satisfaction of
physician j with the schedule in month m. The focus of our evaluation is on two key
performance indicators:





















For both key performance indicators, lower values indicate higher schedule quality.
For the APS indicator, low values indicate that over all planning horizons all physicians
are equally satisfied. Lower values for the ASV indicator signify that all physicians have
a lower fluctuation of their personal satisfaction between planning horizons.
4.1 Real-life data and computational setup
To verify the impact of our model on long-term fairness, we apply it to real-world data
from the anesthesiology department at our partner hospital. Note that our model is
based on the scheduling model which is currently in use at this department and was
also created by us. This department employs about 100 physicians at any time and is
responsible for covering 6 overnight duties per day, requiring one physician per duty.
The data spans a total of 24 months, starting in November 2015 and ending in October
2017. In total, the data contains 9 082 requests for a duty and for being off duty. During
this time span, the data contains 158 distinct physicians employed for varying amounts
of time at the department. However, only 47 of them are employed for the entire time
horizon, accounting for 4 142 requests. As schedules are generated monthly, our data is
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also collected monthly, with each planning horizon spanning one month (4 or 5 weeks).
We run all three variants of our model implementing the different updating strategies
for the satisfaction-based weights for each of the 24 months, resulting in 72 model itera-
tions. Our model is implemented in CMPL 1.11.0, using the IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.7.1.0
solver on Xubuntu 16.04.3, kernel 4.10.0-40. The system is run as a VirtualBox 5.2.2
virtual machine with one virtual core of an Intel Core i5-4310M CPU and 4 GB of main
memory. The software we use to conduct our experiments is written in Python 3 and can
be found on GitHub1, along with the data required to run our experiments. For privacy
reasons, we do not provide the raw data from our partner hospital, but only generated
data derived from it (see below).
C ESA ESD
APS 0.006532 0.006493 0.006503
difference to C −0.000039 −0.000029
difference in % −0.60 % −0.44 %
ASV 0.011292 0.011321 0.011191
difference to C +0.000029 −0.000101
difference in % +0.26 % −0.89 %
Table 1: Values of the performance indicators for all three satisfaction indicator updating
strategies using the real-life data set
For our smoothing constant γ, we need to choose a value between 0 and 1. Higher
values let the satisfaction indicator depend more strongly on more recent values. Lower
values for γ will lead to a stronger dependence on older data for the satisfaction indicator.
However, since most physicians will likely remember their happiness with plans at most
one or two months in the past, we recommend choosing values closer to 1 than to 0. For
our case study, we select γ = 0.8. Preliminary testing with other values of γ indicated
that the key results remain the same. We apply the raw data from our partner hospital
to our model with all three different updating strategies and solve each run to optimality
within 2 seconds. As only 47 physicians are employed continuously for the entire time
horizon, our evaluations only take into account these physicians. For all other physicians
1https://github.com/chrisnig/long-term-fairness
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newly joining our workforce in a month, we set their historic satisfaction to 1 but do
not include them into the calculations for our performance indicators. We display the
values of the APS and ASV indicators for the C, ESA, and ESD strategies for the
continuously employed physicians in table 1. Only very small differences below ±1 %
between our different satisfaction indicator updating strategies can be observed. This
can be explained by the structure of preferences inherent in the data. Our cooperation
hospital uses a web-based software system to track physician preferences. Each physician
can enter their own preferences and simultaneously see all preferences of other physicians
with the same qualification. The system counts the existing preferences and compares
them with the demand for each duty, showing the physician which days of duty have not
been requested yet. While physicians are not prevented by the system from requesting a
duty that another physician has already requested, workplace culture at the department
dictates that you do not submit requests competing with other physicians in general. In
light of this preference elicitation method, it is not surprising that for all our updating
strategies, 97 % of the preferences in the data can be fulfilled. Our model can therefore
rarely make a trade-off between different physicians when fulfilling preferences because
there are no competing preferences. In conclusion, respecting long-term satisfaction using
our satisfaction indicator is not overly effective when used without competing preferences.
Most real-world settings do not exhibit this feature. However, our model does not perform
worse than strategies without long-term satisfaction. Our model respecting long-term
fairness could therefore be used for scheduling problems with no conflicting preferences
and will produce equally good or slightly better results than models without long-term
fairness considerations. Nevertheless, in reality, competing preference requests are usual
and so we show the superior behavior of our models for such situations next.
4.2 Generated data
In order to evaluate the differences between our updating strategies for satisfaction-
based weights, we generate different instances of data for our model. We categorize our
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generated data in terms of preference rate and conflict rate. We define the preference
rate as the number of preferences divided by the number of days of physician availability.
As we only generate preferences for a duty and it is not possible for a physician to
request two consecutive duties due to working time regulations, the preference rate for
our generated data can be at most 50 %. A physician’s preference is in conflict with
another preference when another physician has a preference for the same duty on the
same date. The conflict rate is then defined as the number of preferences which are
in conflict with at least one other preference divided by the total number of preferences.
Note that when generating data with a target conflict rate, this also bounds the preference
rate. As the maximum number of total preferences is limited, it might be required to
remove conflicting preferences to reach a target conflict rate.
Assumptions for our generated data are based on the first planning horizon of real-
life data, which spans 5 weeks in the month of November 2015. Respecting absences, we
derive a supply of 2 978 days of physician availability (including weekends, 7 days per
week). This amount of days can be covered by 2 978
5 weeks·7 days ≈ 85 physicians employed
full-time without any absences. Furthermore, we find that 20 % of physicians have two
qualifications, whereas the rest has only one qualification. Based on these observations,
we generate data for 85 physicians who are each employed for the entire time horizon of
24 months so that each has at least one qualification for a duty, with a 20 % probability
for each physician to hold an additional qualification for a different duty. This ensures
that all physicians are employed continuously and that we can calculate our performance
indicators over all physicians. Additionally, completely removing absences ensures that
all physicians have the same chance of a high satisfaction in a given time span. The
same holds true for generating qualifications which do not change during the planning
horizon. Furthermore, we generate data for 6 duties with a demand of one physician per
day (unchanged from the real-life data).
Our preference generation routine is described by algorithm 1 and operates as follows.
On each day and for each physician, we assume a pon = 80 % probability that the physician
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Algorithm 1 Generating preferences for case study
procedure GeneratePreferences(J , I,W ,D, Doff, Epos, pon)
greq-onjiwd ← 0 ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D
greq-offjwd ← 0 ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W , d ∈ D
for all j ∈ J , w ∈ W , d ∈ D do ◃ iterate randomly
if Doffjwd = 0 then
r ← random rational number in [0, 1)
if r < pon and no preference on previous and next day exists then
I ← {i ∈ I |Eposjiwd = 1}
if I ̸= ∅ then








Algorithm 2 Adjusting the conflict rate of preference data
procedure AdjustConflictRate(J , I,W ,D, Doff, Epos, greq-on, greq-off, gconflict)
c← 0 ◃ counter for number of existing conflicts
Ciwd ← ∅ ∀i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D ◃ set of conflicting preferences on each day
t← 0 ◃ counter for total number of requests
for all i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D do
R̃← {(j, i′, w′, d′) ∈ J × I ×W ×D | i = i′ ∧ w = w′ ∧ d = d′ ∧ greq-onjiwd = 1}
if |R̃| > 1 then
c← c+ |R̃|






◃ current conflict rate
if rconflict > gconflict then
greq-on ← DecreaseConflictRate ◃ see algorithm 3
else if rconflict < gconflict then
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Algorithm 3 Increasing the conflict rate of preferences
procedure IncreaseConflictRate
C̄ ← {(j, i, w, d) ∈ J × I ×W ×D | greq-onjiwd = 1 ∧ (j, i, w, d) /∈ Ciwd}
while rconflict < gconflict ∧ |C̄| > 0 do
randomly select (j, i, w, d) ∈ C̄
J̃ ← {j′ ∈ J |Eposj′iwd = 1} ◃ Candidate physicians for a request for this duty
if |J̃ | = 1 then
C̄ ← C̄ \ {(j, i, w, d)}
else
for all j′ ∈ J̃ do
if j ̸= j′ ∧ greq-offj′wd = 0 ∧ (@i′ ∈ I : g
req-on
j′i′wd = 1) ∧Doffj′wd = 0 then
greq-onj′iwd ← 1
t← t+ 1
C̄ ← C̄ \ {(j, i, w, d)}
c← c+ 2
if |C̄| > 0 then
randomly select (j′′, i′, w′, d′) ∈ C̄
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Algorithm 4 Decreasing the conflict rate of preferences
procedure DecreaseConflictRate
while rconflict > gconflict ∧ c > 0 do
randomly select i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D, such that Ciwd ̸= ∅
randomly select j ∈ J , such that (j, i, w, d) ∈ Ciwd
greq-onjiwd ← 0
c← c− 1
Ciwd ← Ciwd \ {(j, i, w, d)}
t← t− 1
for all w′ ∈ W , d′ ∈ D do ◃ iterate randomly




jw′d′ = 0∧ (@j′ ∈
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has a preference. If there is no preference on the previous day, we randomly select a
preference based on the physician’s qualifications and add it. After all the preferences have
been added, we check whether the target conflict rate has been met and, if required, adjust
it using algorithm 2. If the conflict rate is too high, we remove conflicting preferences
using algorithm 4 and try to assign non-conflicting preferences to keep the total number of
preferences equal, if possible. If the conflict rate is too low, we add conflicting preferences
using algorithm 3 and remove the same amount of non-conflicting preferences in order
to keep the total number of preferences equal. Note that increasing the conflict rate lets
us preserve the total number of preferences, whereas decreasing the conflict rate might
sometimes mandate that we remove previously added preferences from the data. Using
this method, we generate in total 11 sets of data, with a target conflict rate between 0 %
and 100 %, increasing in steps of 10 %. Note that we only generate duty preferences and
do not generate preferences for no duty, because competition between duty preferences
occurs much sooner than between preferences for no duty. This is easily illustrated:
Consider the set of physicians holding a qualification for a certain duty. If there are
several physicians with a preference for this duty on the same day, only one of them
can be fulfilled. However, if all physicians in the set have a preference for no duty on
the same day, then only one of these preferences must be violated as only one of these
physicians must be on duty. Accordingly, as soon as two physicians submit a preference
for the same duty, those preferences are in conflict. However, only if all physicians with
the same qualification submit a preference to be off duty, they are in conflict.
After the data generation, we analyze our generated data for the actual preference
and conflict rates. The results are given in table 2. The data generation routine as well
as the generated data we use for our experiments is included in the published software
code2.
Using the generated data, we run the model for the 24 months of data for each
satisfaction indicator updating strategy, resulting in an additional 24 · 3 · 11 = 792 model
2see footnote on page 23
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Target conflict rate 0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 %
Preference rate 7.06 % 7.56 % 8.18 % 8.93 % 9.87 % 11.09 %
Conflict rate 0.00 % 9.68 % 19.73 % 29.77 % 39.78 % 49.91 %
Target conflict rate 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 % (Real data)
Preference rate 12.57 % 14.54 % 17.86 % 23.43 % 44.99 % 6.35 %
Conflict rate 59.89 % 69.88 % 79.90 % 89.94 % 100 % 10.02 %
Table 2: Preference and conflict rate of data
runs. We solve the models for all strategies to optimality within 2 seconds of solver
running time per model run. Because of the data generation process, all 85 physicians
are employed continuously, so we can calculate our performance indicators on the entire
workforce. Additionally, the qualifications of our generated physicians do not change
during the 24 months and are equally distributed among the duties. Due to the duty
preference generation strategy explained above, we have a varying number of competing
requests for the solver to choose from (see table 2).
First, we take a look at the results for data with a 100 % conflict rate to find out
whether the differences in the key performance indicators between the models are more
pronounced than the ones we have seen for our real-life data in table 1. The values of the
performance indicators for our data with a 100 % conflict rate are displayed in table 3.
Results are interpreted and discussed in detail below.
C ESA ESD
APS 0.004346 0.000433 0.000015
difference to C −0.003913 −0.004331
difference in % −90.04 % −99.65 %
ASV 0.001876 0.012093 0.000423
difference to C +0.010217 −0.001453
difference in % +544.62 % −77.45 %
Table 3: Values of the performance indicators for all three satisfaction indicator updating
strategies using the generated data set with a 100 % target conflict rate
We display the average satisfaction over all 24 months by physician in figure 1. As
this is the basis for the APS indicator, the chart already makes it obvious that the
variance of the displayed data is much greater for the C strategy than for the other
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Figure 1: Average satisfaction 1|M|
∑
m∈M sjm over all 24 months per physician
strategies. In fact, the APS indicator for the ESA strategy is 90 % below the value
for the C strategy, and for the ESD strategy 99 % below the C strategy (see table 3).
This means that for the ESA and ESD strategies, the satisfaction is much more equally
distributed among physicians than for the C strategy. The graph shows a noticeable
peak in satisfaction around physician 34. Our model does not guide the solving process
to solutions with this property, so we assume that underlying heuristics in the standard
solver IBM ILOG CPLEX are responsible for this pattern. We verified this assumption
about the underlying heuristics by running the model for the C strategy with the same
data also with the CBC 2.9.8 solver and found a different pattern which showed a nearly
linear increase in satisfaction with the physician number. As our model for the C strategy
does not optimize for equal distribution of satisfaction over all physicians, these patterns
can be seen in the results. Our ESA and ESD strategies, however, implicitly optimize
for equal distribution of satisfaction among physicians and therefore score better APS
values.
For the ASV indicator, we plot the variance per physician in figure 2. This measures
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Figure 2: Variance between months Varm∈M sjm per physician
how much the satisfaction for each physician varies between the months. The ASV indi-
cator measures the average of the data displayed in the figure. Lower values indicate that
the satisfaction of a physician remains closer to a physician-specific satisfaction average,
whereas higher values indicate a high fluctuation of a physician’s satisfaction between
months. Looking at figure 2, we can see that the average variance of the ESA strategy
is noticeably higher than that of the two other strategies. This can be explained by the
properties of the strategy. The ESA strategy updates the weight given to each physician’s
preferences after each planning horizon. This leads to a pendulum-like fluctuation of the
values. In one planning horizon, a physician does not get many preferences fulfilled, lead-
ing to a high weight for the next planning horizon. Consequently, due to the high weight,
the physician is granted many preferences in the next planning horizon, so that the weight
is greatly reduced after the planning horizon and the cycle repeats. To illustrate this, we
include figure 3, which shows the satisfaction of physician 34 as an example. We select
this physician because it is the physician with the highest variance of satisfaction for the
ESA strategy between months (see figure 2). Here, the repeated increase and decrease
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Figure 3: Satisfaction s34,m for physician 34 for the different updating strategies
in satisfaction for the ESA strategy is visibly more pronounced than fluctuation for both
other strategies. This results in high values for the ASV indicator for strategy ESA
(+545 % on the C strategy). For the C strategy, we again find the same peak around
physician 34 which we already observed in figure 1. As we already know that, due to the
underlying heuristics, physicians with higher numbers rarely get any requests fulfilled, it
is not surprising that the variance of their satisfaction is close to zero when their average
satisfaction is already close to zero. The ESD strategy performs best in terms of the ASV
indicator with a 77 % decrease compared to the C strategy. This can be attributed to the
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fact that it already optimizes the satisfaction and the associated weights for preferences
during the planning horizon, thereby smoothing out high variations in the satisfaction



































Figure 4: Relative difference in performance indicators between ESD and C strategy for
data with different target conflict rate
As the possibility of high variance between the months makes the ESA strategy im-
practical to use, going forward we focus on comparing the ESD strategy with the C
strategy. We have shown that a high conflict rate leads to a high difference in our per-
formance indicators between those two strategies. In what follows, we discuss how the
conflict and preference rates are related to the difference between the strategies. Looking
at the relative change in our performance indicators displayed in figure 4, we find that
with an increasing conflict rate, the decrease in our performance indicators for the ESD
strategy in comparison to the C strategy rises. This means that our ESD strategy has
more effect the higher the conflict rate inherent in the preferences is. The additional drop
in the APV indicator between the target conflict rate of 90 % and 100 % can be explained
by the significant difference in preference rate between those two data sets. Looking at
table 2, we can see that the preference rate between those two data sets nearly doubles.
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This is due to the preference rate being restricted by the conflict rate for the 90 % set-
ting. For the 100 % setting, however, the preference rate is not limited by the conflict rate
anymore, as we can theoretically add an unlimited amount of conflicting preferences and
still keep the conflict rate the same. Therefore, the preference rate for the 100 % setting
is only restricted by semantic constraints, such as not allowing consecutive preferences.
This higher preference rate enables our algorithm to more evenly distribute preferences
for a physician between the months, resulting in the sharp drop in the ASV indicator.
Summarizing, our results recommend using the ESD strategy in any case. Even
for a small conflict rate, this strategy consistently scores better on both performance
indicators. This means that physicians will be treated more fairly in terms of distribution
of fulfilled requests: Over a longer time horizon with multiple planning horizons, physician
satisfaction is more equally distributed than with the C strategy, which models what many
existing physician scheduling models look like in terms of long-term fairness. Additionally,
physician satisfaction fluctuates less between different planning horizons. Physicians can
always expect a similar level of satisfaction for the entire time of their employment.
4.3 Managerial insights
We have shown that models without long-term fairness considerations can create plans
that are disadvantageous to some physicians. When there are no long-term fairness con-
straints built into the model, fairness is not guaranteed and depends on heuristics built
into the solver. This will agitate repeatedly disadvantaged physicians and create conflict
within the work force, which may lead to increased turnover and decreased staff morale.
In the absence of conflicting preferences in the data this is not a big issue. In this case,
fairness needs to be ensured when entering preferences and not by the model. If, how-
ever, there are conflicting preferences in the data, the impact of long-term fairness rises
with the rate of conflicting preferences. As the model performs better than conventional
approaches without long-term fairness even for a small rate of conflicting preferences,
we recommend that schedulers incorporate long-term fairness in their scheduling models,
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regardless of their current rate of conflicting preferences.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes an indicator for measuring satisfaction of physicians with auto-
matically generated duty rosters, focusing on the fulfillment of physicians’ preferences for
duties. We describe a physician scheduling model to assign physicians to overnight duties
based on their preferences and incorporate fairness based on our satisfaction indicator.
We discuss different strategies for updating this indicator over a time horizon spanning
multiple planning horizons. One of our strategies requires a MIQP, which is hard to
solve to optimality on consumer hardware. For this model, we provide an equivalent
MILP which can be solved using standard software. We apply our models to real-life
data from a German university hospital and to generated data based on the real-life
data. Our results indicate that tracking fairness measures over several planning hori-
zons is necessary, because otherwise unfair fulfillment of preferences can accumulate over
time. This leads to unequal treatment of physicians and, if realized by the disadvantaged
physicians, may lead to negative emotions directed towards colleagues or the employer.
The proposed model using a satisfaction-based preference weight solves this problem by
smoothing unequal treatment of different physicians over time.
Our experiments test three different strategies for satisfaction tracking and updating
of the satisfaction-based weights for preference violations: Constant and equal satisfac-
tion (C), satisfaction updates after the planning horizon (ESA), and updates during the
planning horizon (ESD). Our results confirm that not tracking satisfaction, as imple-
mented by the C strategy, can indeed lead to unfair distribution of preference fulfillment.
With the C strategy, the distribution of preference fulfillment is dependent on the under-
lying solver heuristics. The ESA strategy mitigates this, but has a different drawback:
Satisfaction for each physician oscillates between planning horizons with a relatively high
amplitude, therefore physicians do not achieve a consistent satisfaction over several plan-
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ning horizons. This problem is solved by the ESD strategy, which updates the satisfaction
indicator during each planning horizon. It provides better distribution of preference ful-
fillment among all physicians over several planning horizons while also maintaining a
steadier level of satisfaction for each individual physician. However, it comes at the cost
of being implemented via a MIQP. We have shown how to transform this MIQP into a
MILP to enable the application of linear programming solvers to the model.
We believe our insights are valuable to managers and schedulers creating duty rosters
for peer groups of physicians who are interchangeable within the group (i.e., have the same
qualifications). Taking into account long-term fairness is often neglected when creating
automatic scheduling models. Instead, only data from the current planning horizon is
taken into account to create fair rosters. As we have shown, this can lead to unfair
distribution of preference fulfillment among physicians in a peer group. Our satisfaction-
based weights remedy this problem and enable the creation of schedules which are fair
over a longer time horizon. However, care needs to be taken when eliciting preferences.
Our satisfaction-based weights are most effective when physicians are not restricted in
their choice for preference submission by technical or social limitations. When there
are only non-conflicting preferences in the data, it is impossible for the solver to create
fairness by favoring disadvantaged physicians within the peer group and our satisfaction-
based weights show only minor effects. However, our ESD strategy still performs slightly
better than the C strategy, so it can also be used in this case.
Our work opens up possibilities for future research. We use the term “satisfaction” to
denote individual preference fulfillment for a physician. Our assumption is that physicians
are more satisfied with a plan when they have a higher rate of preference fulfillment.
Future research might verify this relationship empirically. We believe our satisfaction
indicator could be adapted to be used for fair distribution of workload, not unlike a
working time account. Currently, we only distribute duties based on preferences. Future
research could focus on an indicator combining fairness in preference fulfillment with
workload distribution. For example, a physician who was unwillingly assigned to a lot
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of duties could be given a higher weight for off-duty requests in the following planning
horizon.
The same approach could also be used for non-medical personnel in the health-care
sector, such as logistics assistants. Current models for logistics assistant planning also
lack fair workload distribution [28]. Additionally, we see a multitude of opportunities to
which our satisfaction indicator could be applied. Previous approaches have, for example,
tried to minimize the amount of unpopular shifts assigned to each physician. Instead of
counting satisfied preferences, our satisfaction indicator could be adapted to count the
instances in which unpopular shifts were not assigned. Alternatively, off-duty requests
could be generated for each unpopular shift and the model could be used as presented.
While our model is based on experience levels for overnight/weekend staffing, it could
also be adapted to handle situations which require physicians of different specialties to be
present. This could be applied to hospitals which schedule physicians during nights and
weekends according to their subspecialties, as proposed by Dexter et al. [8]. In this case, a
separate duty should be created for each subspecialty (instead of for each experience level,
as proposed by us) and physicians would be qualified for the respective subspecialty duty.
With an appropriate demand setting for each duty, this would ensure that physicians of
each specialty are available during the night or on weekends. Alternatively, the physicians
could be partitioned into groups based on specialty and the model could then be applied
to each group separately. However, the value added by subspecialties as perceived by
physicians is mixed [9, 22].
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Appendix C
Long-term workload equality on duty
schedules for physicians in hospitals
The following contribution (Gross, 2018) has been published in “PATAT2018: Pro-
ceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Practice and Theory of Auto-
mated Timetabling”, which is not ranked in the VHB-JOURQUAL3 ranking (Ver-
band der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V., 2015). Additionally, it has
been submitted to “Annals of Operations Research” (category B) for inclusion in a
PATAT special issue. The submitted version is reproduced below in its entirety.
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Long-term workload equality on duty schedules for physicians
in hospitals
Abstract
Staffing hospitals 24 hours a day requires some physicians to be assigned to overnight
duties via duty schedules. As overnight duties have an impact on physicians’ personal
life, physicians can submit preferences indicating when they would prefer to perform
duties and when they would prefer not to be assigned to a duty. The created schedule
then tries to respect those preferences. However, some duties are assigned to physicians
who have not requested them, simply because nobody requested these duties and they
have to be covered. This workload should be evenly distributed. We propose a workload
indicator that tracks how much duties physicians perform over several planning horizons.
The workload from the past is then used to inform decisions on the current plan. Our
workload indicator is integrated into a scheduling model for physicians in hospitals. The
application of our model to test data shows that our workload indicator helps to spread
workload over all physicians more evenly.
Keywords: OR in health services; mixed-integer program; physician scheduling;
long-term fairness; workload distribution
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1 Introduction
Patients in hospitals require around-the-clock care. To provide this, some physicians have
to stay overnight at the hospital and perform so-called overnight duties. Identifying which
physician should stay over night is a complex task. Physicians are assigned to overnight
duties by duty rosters, which need to satisfy a multitude of constraints, such as working
time regulations, minimum staffing levels, and required experience levels. As duties span
the entire night, physicians on duty need to be present at the hospital throughout the
night and need to plan their private lives accordingly. This makes performing duties
quite demanding on physicians. The scheduling process should therefore incorporate
physicians’ preferences for which duties they want to perform. Physicians can request to
be assigned to certain duties and can also request to not be assigned to any duties on a
specific date. Additionally, the workload of duties should be evenly distributed among
all physicians.
Duty rosters for physicians are usually created monthly. Models creating duty rosters
therefore consider a planning horizon of 4 to 5 weeks. Many models in the existing physi-
cian scheduling literature only optimize for the current planning horizon and do not take
into account data from previous planning horizons. When thinking about physician satis-
faction, this might mean that some physicians are repeatedly disadvantaged in sequential
months. In terms of preference fulfillment, it is possible that some physicians are repeat-
edly denied their duty requests whereas other physicians are repeatedly granted their
requests. Gross et al. (2018a) show that using a model that does not equalize preference
fulfillment over several planning horizons creates unequal preference fulfillment between
physicians. With these models, the fulfillment of preferences for an individual physician
– and therefore this physician’s satisfaction – is based on solver implementation details.
Gross et al. (2018a) propose a satisfaction indicator for preference fulfillment to mitigate
this problem and equalize preference fulfillment over all physicians over several planning
horizons. However, they do not take into account duties which have not been requested
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via a preference but must still be assigned to ensure adequate staffing of the hospital. For
these duties, the problem is similar to the one with preference satisfaction: It is possible
that some physicians are repeatedly assigned to many duties they did not request while
others are not.
This work has two main contributions. First, we propose a workload indicator, mod-
eled similarly to the satisfaction indicator by Gross et al. (2018a). Second, we evaluate
the impact of our workload indicator. We incorporate both the existing satisfaction indi-
cator and our proposed workload indicator into a physician scheduling model. The model
is then compared to the model with only the satisfaction indicator and to a model with
only the workload indicator by applying it to the data used by Gross et al. (2018a). We
generate additional data with a varying number of preferences and find that the effective-
ness of the workload indicator is tied to the number of preferences when used together
with the satisfaction indicator. Results indicate that our workload indicator succeeds in
equalizing workload among physicians over several planning horizons.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We review related literature on
equal workload distribution in personnel scheduling in section 2. Afterwards, we provide a
description of long-term equality considerations in physician scheduling and our workload
indicator in section 3. A physician scheduling model for equal workload distribution is
presented in section 4. Section 5 describes the application of our model to data and its
results. Our work is concluded by section 6, which summarizes our findings.
2 Literature
We review literature on scheduling which considers equal workload distribution, with a
focus on scheduling in the health care sector. Most of the reviewed literature does not
incorporate long-term equality of workload over several planning horizons. For more
literature on the topics of this work, we refer to respective literature reviews on inequity
averse optimization (Karsu and Morton, 2015), staff scheduling (Ernst et al., 2004), nurse
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scheduling (Cheang et al., 2003), and physician scheduling (Erhard et al., 2018). Further
literature on fairness in preference fulfillment can also be found in Gross et al. (2018a).
A simple approach to ensure equal workload distribution is setting an upper limit on
the individual workload. The international nurse rostering competition (Haspeslagh et al.,
2014) defines constraints for fairness, such as maximum and minimum number of shifts
assigned to a nurse or the maximum and minimum number of consecutive days on which
a nurse does not have a shift assigned. Additionally, nurses can request to be assigned
to a specific shift or to not be assigned to shifts on a given day. A solution is always
created for the current planning horizon without taking into account fairness data from
the previous planning horizon. The second iteration of the international nurse rostering
competition (Ceschia et al., 2015) introduces a multi-stage scheduling problem. Limits,
such as on the amount of shifts per nurse, were defined as a sum over several planning
horizons. Scheduling therefore requires data from previous plans to make decisions in the
current planning horizon, Furthermore, forecasts for plans in the future are required to
assign shifts in the current planning horizon in such a way that plans in the future are
feasible.
A similar method of restricting individual workload is employed by Fügener et al.
(2015) and Gross et al. (2018b). They assign overnight duties to physicians in a one-month
planning horizon and set an upper limit on the duties which should be assigned to any
individual physician. Any duty above this limit is then penalized with a constant weight,
encouraging the model to assign this duty to another physician whose assignments are
still below the limit. This approach, however, cannot ensure equal workload distribution
above or under the limit. Let (a, b) be an assignment of duties to two physicians where
the first physician is assigned to a duties and the second physician is assigned to b duties.
If the limit is, e.g., 2 duties per planning horizon, then the assignments (1, 1) and (2,
0) are considered equal. Similarly, the assignments (2, 4) and (3, 3) are also considered
equal. Both properties are obviously undesirable. Additionally, the number of assigned
duties above or below the limit is not carried over into the next planning horizon.
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Stolletz and Brunner (2012) create fortnightly physician schedules by using flexible
shift start and end times. Workload is measured in terms of over- and undertime as well as
number of assigned overnight duties. Their proposed model succeeds in creating schedules
which assign exactly the same amount of over- and undertime to each physician. Due
to the number of required overnight duties not necessarily being divisible by the number
of available physicians, the model cannot assign the same number of overnight duties to
each physician. However, it creates an assignment where differences between physicians
are minimized. The amount of assigned over-/undertime and the amount of assigned
overnight duties are not carried over into the next planning horizon.
A survey of constraints on physician scheduling in practice is conducted by Gendreau
et al. (2006). They study the scheduling process in five hospitals in the area of Montreal,
Canada. The study categorizes scheduling constraints into, among others, “workload
constraints” and “fairness constraints”, both with the effect of limiting the amount of
work that is assigned to a single physician and distributing the work equally among all
physicians. In the first category, the authors find limits on the amount of working hours
or number of assigned shifts per physician. This is the same approach as used by Gross
et al. (2018b) and Fügener et al. (2015). The second category describes constraints such
as a fixed number of shifts that needs to be assigned to all physicians with the same
experience level, or a maximum number of weekends shifts in a certain period. There is
no mention that deviations from these constraints are carried over into the next planning
horizon.
A different approach to long-term fairness is taken by Carrasco (2010). Instead of
carrying inequalities into the next planning horizon, he chooses a sufficiently large plan-
ning horizon to be able to create equal assignments during the planning horizon. While
most scheduling models use a one-month planning horizon, this approach uses 12 months
and creates overnight duty rosters for a Spanish hospital. As such large instances cannot
be solved using linear optimization in acceptable time and memory, an algorithm is pro-
posed that creates schedules while selecting employees for shifts in such a way that the
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workload is equalized throughout the planning horizon. However, this schedule cannot
incorporate midterm changes which are not known at the time of schedule creation, such
as personnel turnover. Vacation also has to be planned either ahead of schedule creation
or by exchanging shifts between physicians to keep the global workload balance intact.
Summarizing, current work on fairness in physician scheduling largely does not con-
sider long-term fairness over several months. Most approaches just provide fairness dur-
ing the planning horizon and do not take into account data from the past. As planning
horizons in physician scheduling are usually one to two months, this is not a sufficient
time span to create total fairness among physicians. Some existing approaches solve this
problem by extending the planning horizon to a year but this creates new problems as
required changes to such a plan will be abundant. Research on how to provide long-term
fairness on physician duty schedules between several planning horizons of one month is
currently lacking.
3 Physician scheduling and long-term equality con-
siderations
We now provide a more detailed description of the physician scheduling problem with
a focus on considerations of long-term equality among physicians over several planning
horizons. In hospitals, patients need to be cared for around the clock. During the day, a
sufficient number of physicians is always present to perform scheduled procedures. During
the night, no procedures are scheduled and physicians are only present to ensure adequate
care in case of emergencies. Therefore, there are only a few physicians present during night
hours. To ensure that a sufficient number of physicians is always present, physicians are
assigned to overnight duties via a roster. These rosters have to fulfill many requirements,
which makes their creation quite complex. For a sufficiently large number of physicians
the number of possible schedules is virtually endless. This makes it hard for human
schedulers to create a schedule respecting all the constraints. Often, software-assisted
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scheduling is employed to create optimal schedules. Research on physician scheduling is
abundant. A recent review of this area of research was published by Erhard et al. (2018).
They find that many works on rostering problems, such as the one we describe, create
rosters for planning horizons of up to six weeks. This is a comparatively short time span
when the goal is to equalize workload or fulfillment of physician preferences. However,
not many works take into account data from the previous planning horizon to create the
next roster. This opens up the possibility that some physicians are disadvantaged by the
plan repeatedly.
Gross et al. (2018a) show that this is not only a theoretical possibility but rather a
real problem which can occur in practice. They calculate the satisfaction of physicians
in terms of preference fulfillment and propose several strategies for equalizing physician
satisfaction over all physicians. The constant strategy, denoted by C, only maximizes
satisfaction over all physicians in the current planning horizon. This is what many similar
physician rostering models implement. The second strategy, denoted by ESA, calculates
a satisfaction indicator for each physician for each planning horizon and then uses that
satisfaction indicator to calculate the individual physician’s preference weight for the next
planning horizon. Their third strategy, denoted by ESD, calculates the satisfaction not
only after planning horizons but continuously updates the satisfaction and physicians’
individual weights online during the rostering process. In this case, the preference weight
is a decision variable based on the amount of satisfied preferences, i.e., when the model
satisfies a preference it simultaneously changes the physician’s preference weight. An
application of their models to 24 months of data based on a real-life problem shows that
the C strategy indeed disadvantages certain physicians in the long run. In contrast, the
ESD strategy performs best when considering the equal distribution of satisfaction over all
physicians after all 24 planning horizons as well as the variance of satisfaction between
planning horizons for each physician. Or in other words: After 24 planning horizons,
schedules created with the ESD strategy distributed satisfaction among physician more
equally than the C strategy. Additionally, the ESD strategy achieved a more stable level
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of satisfaction between months for each physician than the ESA strategy.
An additional factor in physician happiness is the distribution of the workload. The
problem here is similar: slightly unequal distribution of workload during one planning
horizon does not have a huge impact, but if the same set of physicians is repeatedly as-
signed a higher workload over several planning horizons, this unequal treatment adds up
and can lead to physician attrition. The focus of this work is therefore the equal distribu-
tion of workload over many planning horizons. Our main contribution is the introduction
of a workload indicator for physician scheduling. We integrate this workload indicator
into a scheduling model and combine it with the satisfaction indicator introduced by
Gross et al. (2018a).
3.1 Physician-specific workload indicator
To measure the individual workload of each physician, we define a workload indicator.
This workload indicator can be calculated for each duty roster and for each physician.
Intuitively, we define the workload indicator as the amount of overnight duties a physician
is assigned on a roster divided by the number of days in the roster. This gives us an
approximation of the number of overnight duties this physician performs per day. Note
that the division by the number of days is unavoidable as duty rosters have different
lengths (4 or 5 weeks) in different planning horizons. We define the workload indicator
on a roster which assigns physicians J to duties I on days D in weeks W . xjiwd is a
binary variable which is 1 if physician j is assigned to duty i on day d of week w and 0









Our approach differs from existing work by its focus on the individual physician.
Existing approaches discuss indicators for groups, such as minimizing the maximum de-
viation from the average of a group’s working hours. Our workload indicator, however,
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tracks the workload for each physician individually, regardless of other physicians’ work-
load. This individual indicator can then be used to calculate weights which can compare
physicians in a group with each other without requiring some sort of group baseline for
working hours or number of assigned duties.
4 Model
We propose a model to assign overnight duties to physicians. Our model is derived from
the model proposed by Gross et al. (2018a). It assigns physicians j ∈ J to duties i ∈ I
on days d ∈ D of weeks w ∈ W . Each physician can be assigned to at most one duty per
day and needs to be given the next day off, i.e., physicians cannot be assigned to duties
on consecutive days. Similarly, physicians cannot be assigned to duties on consecutive
weekends. The number of required physicians for a duty i on the day of the week d is
given by d̄dutyid . We implement this demand as an upper bound, so we can always find
feasible solutions even if there is an insufficient number of physicians available to perform
a duty. This undercoverage can then be seen in decision variables ∆out-dutyiwd and will need
to be handled by human schedulers. Not every physician should be assigned to every
duty. Our model requires parameters Eposjiwd to specify which physician can be assigned to
which duty on which day. As we also do not want to assign physicians to duties when they
are absent, our model respects absences supplied in parameters Doffjwd. Physicians want to
have a say in which duties they are assigned to. We provide physicians’ preferences to be
assigned to a duty in parameters greq-onjiwd and the preferences to not be assigned to a duty
in parameters greq-offjwd . Our model tracks the violations of these preferences with variables
∆req-onjiwd and ∆
req-off
jwd . As we consider preference fulfillment and workload distribution from
past planning horizons, we provide the historic satisfaction with preference fulfillment in
parameters ŝj and the historic workload in parameters l̂j.
The model we introduce has two sets of conflicting constraints. The first set consists
of {(11a), (11b)}, and the second set consists of {(13a), (13b)}. Note that these numbers
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refer to constraints introduced below. We choose not to repeat them here to avoid dupli-
cation. When implementing the model, only one constraint out of each set can be used,
otherwise the model becomes infeasible. As our model is geared towards evaluating the
impact of satisfaction and workload indicators, these constraints each implement a dif-
ferent strategy for updating these indicators. Regarding equal distribution of preference
fulfillment, we define two different strategies:
I. No preference fulfillment (unfair, U) For this strategy, we use constraints (11a).
This effectively disables preferences in the model, meaning the solver will not opti-
mize for the fulfillment of preferences. With this strategy, physicians’ preferences
are completely ignored.
II. Long-term fair preference fulfillment (fair, F) This strategy is implemented by
constraints (11b). These constraints implement the ESD strategy as proposed by
Gross et al. (2018a). They use a physician-specific satisfaction indicator to ensure
long-term equal preference fulfillment among all physicians while updating the sat-
isfaction continuously during the solving of the model. This is achieved by basing
the satisfaction-based weight directly on the satisfaction indicator of the current
planning horizon, thereby requiring a quadratic decision model. They describe how
this can be transformed into a linear decision model. Note that we do not imple-
ment the other strategies for equal preference fulfillment proposed by Gross et al.
(2018a) because they find that the ESD strategy creates superior results for the
APS and ASV performance indicators in comparison to all other tested strategies.
To achieve equal distribution of workload, we define two different strategies:
I. Constant workload-based weight (CL) We set the workload-based weight to 0 for
all physicians. This effectively disables tracking the workload among physicians.
For this strategy, we use constraints (13a).
II. Exponential smoothing for workload-based weight during the planning
horizon (ESL) We update the workload-based weight in the model, i.e., during
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the planning horizon, depending on the amount of duties assigned to the respective
physician. This strategy requires the use of constraints (13b). Note that this results
in a quadratic decision model as well, for which we describe an equivalent linear
formulation in section 4.1.
In their study of the satisfaction indicator, Gross et al. (2018a) also evaluate a strategy
with exponential smoothing of the satisfaction indicator after each planning horizon and
no updating during the planning horizon. Based on the results found in their evaluation,
we refrain from applying this strategy to the workload indicator and defining a model
with exponential smoothing of the workload indicator after the planning horizon. This
strategy has the downside of alternating between high and low values for the smoothed
values, leading to a high fluctuation of the weights derived from them between planning
horizons. As these results discovered for the satisfaction indicator can be generalized,
we expect the same results for a similar strategy for the workload-based weights. We
therefore only incorporate the ESL strategy with exponential smoothing in the model
itself.
Sets and indices
d ∈ D = {1, ..., 7} Days of the week, starting with Monday = 1
i ∈ I Duties
j ∈ J Physicians
w ∈ W Weeks in the planning horizon
Parameters
α1 Weight for personnel demand coverage
α2 Weight for preference fulfillment
α3 Weight for workload distribution
γ1 Smoothing constant for satisfaction indicator
γ2 Smoothing constant for workload indicator
ŝj Pre-computed value as an input to calculate satisfaction-based
weight for physician j based on the previous planning horizon
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l̂j Pre-computed value as input to calculate workload-based weight
for physician j based on the previous planning horizon
d̄dutyid Demand of physicians for duty i on day d
greq-onjiwd 1 if physician j has a preference for duty i on day d of week w, 0
otherwise
greq-offjwd 1 if physician j has a preference for being off duty on day d of week
w, 0 otherwise
Eposjiwd 1 if physician j can be assigned to duty i on day d of week w, 0
otherwise
Doffjwd 1 if physician j is absent on day d of week w, 0 otherwise
Decision variables
xjiwd ∈ {0, 1} 1 if physician j is assigned to duty i on day d of week w, 0 otherwise
sj ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R Satisfaction-based weight for preferences of physician j for the cur-
rent planning horizon
σj ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R Satisfaction indicator for physician j (Gross et al., 2018a)
lj ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R Workload-based weight for assignment of duties to physician j for
the current planning horizon
λj ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ N0 Workload indicator for physician j
xWEjw ∈ {0, 1} 1 if physician j is assigned to a duty on the weekend of week w, 0
otherwise
∆out-dutyiwd ∈ N0 Missing physicians to cover demand of duty i on day d of week w
∆req-onjiwd ∈ {0, 1} 1 if preference of physician j for duty i on day d of week w is not
satisfied, 0 otherwise
∆req-offjwd ∈ {0, 1} 1 if preference of physician j for being off duty on day d of week w




















































id ∀i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D (2)
∆req-onjiwd = g
req-on






xjiwd ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W , d ∈ D (4)
∑
i∈I






























xjiw,1 ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J , w ∈ W , w > 1 (8b)
xWEjw + x
WE
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sj = 2 ∀j ∈ J (11a)
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jwd ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J , i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D (15)
sj, σj, lj, λj ∈ R+ ∀j ∈ J (16)
∆out-dutyiwd ∈ N0 ∀i ∈ I, w ∈ W , d ∈ D (17)
Our objective function describes our three main objectives. Term (1a) penalizes un-
dercoverage, i.e., assigning an insufficient number of physicians to duties. Term (1b)
penalizes preference violations based on physician-specific satisfaction-based weights. We
weight the preference violations with α2 ·(2−sj), as recommended by Gross et al. (2018a).
This is required because 0 ≤ sj ≤ 1 and smaller values for sj should result in a higher
weight. The strategy to calculate the satisfaction-based weight sj based on the satisfac-
tion indicator is implemented by constraints (11a) or (11b). Finally, term (1c) punishes
assigning duties to physicians. This term contains the individual physician’s workload-
based weight. Our model will therefore incur different penalties for assigning a duty,
based on the workload of the physician to which we are assigning the duty. This guides
the model towards assigning duties to physicians with a lower workload-based weight
and therefore results in a more equal distribution of assigned duties among physicians.
The strategy to calculate the workload-based weight lj based on the workload indicator
is implemented by constraints (13a) or (13b).
To ensure that an adequate number of physicians is assigned to each duty, con-
straints (2) set deviation variables ∆out-dutyiwd in case a duty is not covered. Constraints (3)
and (4) set deviation variables ∆req-onjiwd and ∆
req-off
jwd when physician preferences for a cer-
tain duty or for not being assigned to any duty are violated. To ensure that a physician
is not assigned to more than one duty per day, we use constraints (5). A valid duty
roster cannot assign duties to physicians who are either not present or not qualified for
the assigned duty. This is ensured by constraints (6) and (7). As duties span the entire
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night, physicians need to be given a day off after a duty and cannot be assigned to a
duty on the following day. Constraints (8a) ensure this for Tuesday through Sunday and
constraints (8b) for Monday. As physicians are unwilling to work duties on consecutive
weekends, we track whether a physician is working on a weekend with constraints (10) and
prevent assigning duties on consecutive weekends with constraints (9). Constraints (11a)
and (11b) specify how our satisfaction-based weights for preference fulfillment are cal-
culated. These constraints are conflicting, so only one of them can be included in the
model at any time. Constraints (11a) effectively disable objective (1b), whereas con-
straints (11b) calculate the satisfaction-based weight using exponential smoothing. The
satisfaction indicator for each physician (see Gross et al., 2018a) is calculated for the
current planning horizon using constraints (12). Constraints (13a) and (13b) set our
workload-based weights. These constraints are conflicting and we can include only one
at a time in the model. Constraints (13a) disable physician-specific workload-based dis-
tribution of duties (1c), and constraints (13b) calculate the workload-based weight using
exponential smoothing on the current workload and the historic workload. See sec-
tion 5 for how we use constraints (11a), (11b), (13a), and (13b) to evaluate the effects
of satisfaction- and workload-based weights. Constraints (14) calculate the workload in-
dicator (see section 3.1) for each physician for the current planning horizon. Finally,
constraints (15), (16), and (17) restrict the domains of our decision variables.
4.1 Linearization of the model
In the form above, our decision model is a quadratic decision model. This can be seen
in objective terms (1b) and (1c). For term (1b), we apply the linearization described by
Gross et al. (2018a). For term (1c), we can identify two cases: In the first case, we use
constraints (13a). This means that lj is set to a fixed value of 0 and can be modeled as
a parameter, making the model linear. For the second case, we use constraints (13b). In
this case, lj must be modeled as a decision variable and our decision model is quadratic.
We now describe a linearization for the second case to transform the model with con-
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straints (13b) into a linear decision model.
Looking at the workload indicator λj for physician j, we find that it depends on the






d∈D xjiwd), the amount of days per
week |D|, and the amount of weeks in the planning horizon |W|. As the amount of days
and weeks are parameters, these values can never change and are always constant for
all physicians. The sum of assignments, however, is described by decision variables and
is different for each physician. When thinking about what possible values our workload
indicator can assume, we therefore need to identify all possible values the sum of assign-
ments can assume. We know that physicians cannot be assigned to duties on consecutive
days as they need to rest on a day after a duty. It follows that physicians can at most
be assigned to a duty on half of the days in the planning horizon. Additionally, we know
that physicians cannot be assigned to more than one duty per day. The upper bound






As x is a binary variable and therefore integer, the sum over x must always be integer.
We can therefore enumerate all integers between 0 and the UB to find all possible values
for the sum of duty assignments for physician j. We define the set A as all possible




∣∣∣∣n ∈ N0 ∧ n ≤ ⌈ |W| · |D|2
⌉}
Using these values, we can then pre-calculate the workload indicator λj for physician
j for all possible values a ∈ A and in consequence the workload-based weight lj for
physician j. Using these, we can calculate the workload-based cost cworkja incurred by
assigning a duties to physician j as follows.
cworkja = α3 · lj · a
= α3 ·
(
γ2 · λj + (1− γ2) · l̂j
)
· a







+ (1− γ2) · l̂j
)
· a
As can be seen, cworkja does not depend on any decision variables and can therefore
be supplied as parameters. For our objective function, we want to replace the quadratic
formulation. In its stead, we want to select the appropriate cost values cworkja . To achieve
this, we introduce an additional binary decision variable zja which is 1 if physician j is










Additionally, we add the following constraints to the model.
∑
a∈A










(a · zja) ∀j ∈ J (20)
The quadratic term (1c) in the objective function has now been replaced by the linear
term (18). Constraints (19) are linear and ensure that exactly one number of assignments
a is selected via z for each physician. Constraints (20) are also linear and ensure that the
selected number of assignments a is equal to the actual number of assignments. Therefore,
we now have a linear model that we can solve using any MILP solver.
5 Computational Study
To enable a comparison of physician satisfaction and workload between planning horizons,
we add an index m ∈ M to the satisfaction and workload indicators, with M being the
set of all the months for which we create duty rosters. σjm and λjm then describe the
satisfaction and workload indicators for physician j on the duty roster for month m,
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respectively.
We evaluate our results using the APS and ASV performance indicators introduced
by Gross et al. (2018a):





















Additionally, we define the following two performance indicators for plan quality in
terms of equal distribution of workload.





















All our experiments are run on a VirtualBox 5.2.6 virtual machine with 4 GB of
RAM and one virtual core of an Intel i5-4310M CPU, running Xubuntu 16.04.3 on kernel
4.13.0-32. Our model is implemented in CMPL 1.11.0 and is solved with IBM ILOG
CPLEX 12.7.1.0. The software used for our experiments is derived from the published
code by Gross et al. (2018a) and can be found on GitHub∗. Each of our instances can
be solved to optimality within 4 seconds. We choose the weights for our computational
∗https://github.com/chrisnig/long-term-workload
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study lexicographically, i.e., α1 ≫ α2 ≫ α3 (α1 = 100, α2 = 10, α3 = 1). This is
based on our assumption that the coverage of all duties is much more important than
the equal fulfillment of preferences, which in turn is much more important than the equal
distribution of workload. Our smoothing constants γ1 and γ2 are both set to 0.8. Setting
these smoothing constants to a value close to 1 puts more weight on data from the more
recent planning horizons in comparison to data from the past. As physicians’ happiness
depends more on their treatment in the more recent past, we put a high emphasis on the
more recent satisfaction and workload data.
5.1 Data with varying conflict rate
First, we apply our model to the data presented by Gross et al. (2018a) on GitHub† which
is based on real world data from a German university hospital. This data contains 85
physicians who are employed throughout the time horizon, which consists of 24 months
with 4 to 5 weeks each. There are 6 duties to be covered with a demand of 1 physician
per day. In the data, no physicians are absent. A preference is defined as being in conflict
when there is at least one other preference by a different physician for the same duty on
the same date. The conflict rate is then defined as the number of conflicting preferences
divided by the total number of preferences. The preference probability is defined as the
probability that a physician is assigned a preference during data generation on any given
day. A preference probability of 80 % indicates that for any given physician on any given
day the preference generation algorithm assigns a preference with a probability of 80 %.
The preference rate is then defined as the number of actual preferences divided by the
number of days. It follows that the preference rate is always bounded by the preference
probability. The data exhibits duty preferences with a preference probability of 80 % and
different target conflict rates between 0 and 100 %.
The different strategies for equal preference fulfillment and equal distribution of work-
load are introduced in section 4. As we need to choose a preference fulfillment strategy
†https://github.com/chrisnig/long-term-fairness
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and a workload distribution strategy for each experiment, we will denote the combination
of the two strategies as A-B, where A is the strategy for preference fulfillment (U or F)
and B is the strategy for workload distribution (CL or ESL). See table 2 for an overview
of the combinations of strategies used in our study. Initially, we compare the U-CL
strategy and the U-ESL strategy and apply both strategies to the data set with a 0 %
conflict rate. This means we ignore physician preferences completely and just optimize
for coverage (U-CL) or for coverage and equal workload distribution (U-ESL). As we do
not consider preferences in either strategy, evaluating the results by the APS and ASV
performance indicators is not meaningful, because those only evaluate preference fulfill-
ment. Instead, we only evaluate the results based on the APL and ALV indicators. The
results can be found in table 3. For both indicators, we find a dramatic decrease of about
99 % for the U-ESL strategy in comparison with the U-CL strategy. This proves that our
workload indicator is effective in influencing our key performance indicators for workload
distribution and shows that it can achieve a more equal distribution of workload among
physicians (APL) and a more equal distribution of workload between months for each
individual physician (ALV ).
preferences workload





Table 2: Overview of used combinations of preference fulfillment strategies (U/F) and
workload distribution strategies (CL/ESL)
The incorporation and fulfillment of physician preferences in the scheduling process is
very important, usually even more important than the equal distribution of workload. In
order to demonstrate that our workload indicator is also effective when used in conjunc-
tion with physician preferences, we now use the F strategy for equal preference fulfillment
for all further experiments. We now apply the F-CL and F-ESL strategies for our model
to the data and calculate the APS, ASV , APL, and ALV performance indicators. We




difference to U-CL −0.006063
difference in % −99.80 %
ALV 0.006694 0.000082
difference to U-CL −0.006612
difference in % −98.78 %
Table 3: Values of the performance indicators for the U-CL and U-ESL strategies using
the data set with a 0 % conflict rate
compare each indicator for the F-CL model with the indicator for the F-ESL model and
report the change as a percentage in figure 1. Note that the model for the F-CL strategy
is identical to the model for the ESD strategy proposed by Gross et al. (2018a) as it only

































APS ASV APL ALV
Figure 1: Relative difference in performance indicators between F-CL and F-ESL strategy
for data with different target conflict rate
As can be seen from the graph, none of the key performance indicators change a lot
between the data sets for different target conflict rates. The improvement in the workload
performance indicators APL and ALV fluctuates at −20 % with a slight downward trend
with increasing target conflict rate. This can be attributed to the higher preference rate
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which comes with the higher conflict rate. Data with higher conflict rates have higher
preference rates. This can be attributed to the preference/conflict generation algorithm
used by Gross et al. (2018a): First, preferences are generated at random with a given
preference probability. Second, in order to meet the target conflict rate, if the conflict
rate inherent in the generated preferences is too high, conflicting preferences are removed
until the target conflict rate is reached. This reduces the preference rate for data with a
low target conflict rate. When there are more preferences, the ideal plan is not as highly
constrained as it is for lower preference rates: With lower preference rates, there are not
that many physicians who have a preference for the same duty on a day. As we penalize
preference violations more harshly than unequal distribution of duties, the solver will
always try to fulfill these preferences, even if it results in a more unequal distribution
of duties. The higher the preference rate, the more likely it is that several physicians
enter a preference for the same duty on the same day. The solver can then choose the
physician to assign to the duty in such a way that duties are more equally distributed,
without incurring a penalty for violating a duty preference.
For the fairness indicators APS and ASV , we can identify a similarly small downward
trend with higher target conflict rate. It may seem surprising that improvements, i.e., a
negative relative change, is even possible for these performance indicators as the F-CL
and F-ESL strategy both contain the same constraints for equal distribution of preference
fulfillment. One might assume that optimizing for equal preference fulfillment in the F-
CL model would already yield the optimal result for the APS and ASV performance
indicators, so that the F-ESL model could not possibly improve on this. However, there
are some situations where several optimal solutions for the F-CL model exist, which are
different in terms of the APS and ASV performance indicators. The F-ESL strategy
will therefore be able to distribute some duties in a different way without achieving a
worse score for our fairness objective (1b), but at the same time improving the objective
of equal distribution of duties (1c). As the preferences in our test data are also equally
distributed, this implicitly improves the fairness performance indicators APS and ASV .
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Because the differences between all optimal solutions for the F-CL strategy are small,
reductions in the fairness performance indicators are always below 20 %. In some cases,
improvements are even impossible and the key performance indicators for fairness are
worse when taking into account equal workload distribution in the model, e.g., for a
target conflict rate of 30 %.
5.2 Data with varying preference probability
Next, we take a look at how our performance indicators behave for different preference
rates. We use the same 24 months of base data and generate preference data with the
preference generation algorithm proposed by Gross et al. (2018a). The only difference in
our generation strategy can be found in the preference probability, i.e., the probability
that a physician submits a preference on any given day in the planning horizon. While
Gross et al. (2018a) always assume a preference probability pon = 80 % and adjust the
generated data to match a target conflict probability, we vary this probability between
0 % and 100 % and skip the adjustment for the conflict probability. We generate data
for each preference probability in increments of 10 percentage points. For each generated
data set with a different preference probability, we run the models for both our strategies
and calculate the key performance indicators for fairness and equal workload distribution
of duties. The graph in figure 2 shows the relative change in key performance indicators
between the F-ESL and the F-CL strategy. This table shows the value of the respective
key performance indicator for the F-CL strategy subtracted from the value for the F-ESL
strategy and the result then divided by the value for the F-CL strategy.
For the APL and ALV indicators, we see that the biggest improvement can be
achieved with a preference probability of 0 %. This is not surprising, as having no
preferences at all essentially prevents the model from optimizing the roster according
to submitted preferences. Note that this means that the model for the F-CL strategy
with a 0 % preference rate is identical to the U-CL model. It is therefore not surprising
that we exhibit similar differences in performance indicators as in table 3. The only
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Figure 2: Relative difference in performance indicators between F-ESL and F-CL strategy
for data with different preference probability
objective that is weighted higher than the equal distribution of duties is the coverage of
all duties. As the coverage is easily fulfilled and does not interfere with how the duties
are distributed, the model will distribute the duties only according to our constraints
for equal workload distribution. As soon as we start introducing preferences, we can see
that the improvement in the APL and APV performance indicators decreases. This is
because our model will distribute duties in such a way that preferences are fulfilled first,
and only then optimize for the equal distribution of duties among physicians. This means
our model will only move duties between physicians to create a more equal distribution if
this is not in conflict with the objective of satisfying preferences equally. Essentially, the
model can only move duties between physicians who have both submitted a preference for
the same duty on the same day or duties which have not been requested by any physician,
severely limiting the possibilities for achieving an equal distribution. In consequence, the
improvement in the performance indicators for equal distribution (APL, ALV ) declines
with a rising preference probability.
When looking at the APS and ASV indicators for physician satisfaction, we can see
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that these start at a 0 % improvement and the improvement then gradually increases
until it starts fluctuating around 20 % for a preference probability of 50 % and above.
The 0 % improvement for a preference probability of 0 % can be easily explained: This
data set does not contain any preferences at all, so no preferences can be fulfilled. In
consequence, regardless of what strategy or model we use, the preference fulfillment will
always be at 0 and the difference between the performance indicators will also always be
0. As the preference rate increases, the model can start fulfilling preferences. As already
explained for the data set with varying conflict rates, our F-ESL strategy will now resolve
stalemates in the preference fulfillment objective with a bias to distribute duties more
evenly. This, in turn, will also lead to an improvement in the satisfaction performance
indicators because our duty preferences are also distributed evenly.
All our performance indicators converge to a constant improvement value around
which they fluctuate for preference probabilities over 50 %. For preference rates higher
than 50 %, no noticeable change is recognizable in the improvement in the performance
indicators. This phenomenon results from the upper limit on preferences we implicitly
define. As a physician cannot work two consecutive duties, we also do not allow specifying






. The maximum preference rate, i.e., the number of days with a preference
divided by the total number of days in the planning horizon, is therefore close to 50 %.
The actual preference rate, however, is somewhat lower as the random iteration of the
preference generation algorithm makes it unlikely to distribute the preferences in such a
way that there is a preference on every other day. It follows that preference probabilities
above 50 % will start converging towards a preference rate of less than 50 %, meaning
the change in the preference rate between a preference probability of 50 % and 100 %
will be smaller than the change in preference rate for a preference probability between
10 % and 50 %. To illustrate this, we show the actual preference rate compared to the
preference probability in figure 3, which shows the flattening of the preference rate with
increasing preference probability.





























Figure 3: Resulting preference rate when running the preference generation algorithm
with different preference probabilities
5.3 Managerial results
Our results indicate that our workload indicator can improve the equal distribution of
workload among physicians in all settings. As we reward the equal distribution of prefer-
ence fulfillment more than the equal distribution of workload, our workload indicator is
especially effective when there are no preferences or only a small number of preferences.
For a higher number of preferences, our workload indicator can still achieve a more equal
distribution of workload, but the improvements are smaller. We therefore recommend
implementing our workload indicator to schedulers, regardless of the preference rate in
their data. Improvements in the equal distribution of workload will be more noticeable on
rosters with less preferences. Additionally, schedulers should identify in which order the
objectives of equal preference fulfillment and equal workload distribution are important
for satisfaction of their workforce. In our experiments, we assume that equal preference
fulfillment is more important than equal workload distribution, which is reflected in our
α-weights. These weights (α2 for equal preference fulfillment and α3 for equal workload
distribution) should be adjusted in accordance with the priorities of the physicians to be




Our work describes a workload indicator to measure an individual physician’s workload
based on a given duty roster. We incorporate the workload indicator into a scheduling
model which creates duty rosters for physicians. Our model takes into account the indi-
vidual workload of each physician based on previous rosters and distributes the workload
in the new roster in such a way that the workload is equalized over all physicians in the
long term. To track this workload over several planning horizons, we require a quadratic
decision model. We describe a linearization of this model so it can be transformed into
an equivalent linear decision model. Our model with workload tracking is evaluated in
comparison to a model without workload tracking. For our study, we apply generated
data for 24 months of physician schedules to both models and compare the results using
performance indicators. Our results indicate that the workload indicator is effective in
ensuring a more equal distribution of workload (i.e., overnight duties) among physicians.
The effectiveness of our workload indicator is higher when it does not have to compete
with higher ranked objectives, such as, e.g., equal fulfillment of preferences.
Our results provide valuable insights for managers and schedulers. We show that with-
out our workload indicator the distribution of workload is not necessarily equal among
physicians. This inequality can accumulate over several planning horizons and lead to
dissatisfaction for physicians who are repeatedly burdened with a high workload. For
all test instances, using our workload indicator leads to a more equal distribution of
workload among physicians over several planning horizons. We therefore recommend
managers incorporate our workload indicator into their scheduling process.
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